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WHAT IS AT STAKE,
AND
WHY NOT SAY SO?

by

C. E. M. JOAD

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ON AUGUST 13TH the Prime Minister was asked in the House of Commons whether the Government would make a statement of its war aims. The Lord Privy Seal, Mr. Attlee, replying on the Prime Minister's behalf, said that the Government's aims would be elaborated at the appropriate time.

Mr. Vernon Bartlett : Will the Right Honourable Gentleman define 'the appropriate time'?

Mr. Attlee : An appropriate time is a time which is appropriate.

CHAPTER I

OPPORTUNITY

THE COMING OPPORTUNITY

ON AUGUST 25TH Hitler was to have dined, presumably on vegetables, in Buckingham Palace. That dinner remains uneaten. I make no pretension to a comprehensive knowledge of Hitler's sayings' and doings, but I have the impression that this' is the first of his major pronouncements that has been falsified by events. Again and again during the last seven years, he has proclaimed the most outrageous doctrines and promised the most incredible performances; and again and again the doctrines have been put into practice—Aryan dogs, for example, *really* have been prevented from mating with non-Aryan dogs—and the promises have been fulfilled—Hitler *really* did ride in triumph down the Champs Elysées. And now for the first time a promise has not been fulfilled. Hitler may have dined at Versailles, but he has not dined at Buckingham Palace. The effect of this first great failure is likely to be considerable. It has shattered the myth of infallibility and the legend of invincibility. So much for August. . . .

By the end of October the attack on England will either have been made and failed or will not have been made. At the time of writing it is impossible to say which of these contingencies will be realized, but it is obvious that it will be one or the other. So much for September and October. . . .

During the coming winter there will be little to eat in Germany; there will be still less in the countries conquered by Germany. Just as the milk of Germany is

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skimmed to feed German soldiers, so the milk of France and Holland and Belgium and Denmark and Czechoslovakia and Norway will be skimmed to feed German civilians. It is difficult to believe that the people of these countries, living on the remnants of the skimming of their own products—living, in Abraham Lincoln's classic phrase, on "soup so thin that it might have been made by boiling down the shadow of a chicken that had died of starvation"—will not be sensible of a certain discontent; that they will not be in a mood to welcome change. So much for November and December, and so into 1941. . . .

With Hitler proved fallible, the great invasion repulsed or not attempted, the peoples of Europe starving, there will occur sometime in the middle of the winter a golden opportunity, the opportunity of fomenting revolt in Europe. How will the Nazis deal with this situation? By force and by propaganda. The Nazi method of force consists in the infliction of gross physical agony upon those who venture to think, speak or act in ways which are contrary to the wishes of the Nazis. It is sufficiently familiar to any boy who has served his apprenticeship to life in a public school; it is the method of the school bully, and it is unnecessary to dilate upon it here.

WHAT THE NAZIS WILL SAY

Of Nazi propaganda, however, something must be said. Faced by the discontent of disillusioned Germans and the hatred of famine-stricken subjects, the Nazis, I imagine, will argue somewhat as follows: "We know that things are bad and food is short, and we are sorry for it. But why is food short? Because of the British blockade. Britain declared war. Britain rejected our proposals for peace. When the Fuehrer proclaimed his willingness to make a peace on reasonable terms last July, the British refused even to consider his offer. For the British, not content with their Empire, want to dominate Europe, and they are setting about the task in their usual way, which is to starve women and children. Help us, then, to break the

blockade; help us to blockade Britain in our turn; help us to humble this power which, herself bloated with wealth, is bent on the impoverishment of Europe, and you will have both peace and food. For the Fuehrer has a plan for a united Europe which will guarantee security and plenty for all."

It would, I think, be foolish to belittle the effects of this propaganda on a starving Europe. On the day on which these lines are written, M. Baudouin, Foreign Minister in the Pétain Government, has been stigmatizing our refusal to lift the blockade as "an act of hostility" to France. His broadcast speech concluded with an eloquent denunciation of our "dictatorship of famine" as "inhuman, unworthy of a Christian country and finally disastrous for those who practise it." Nor, he adds, will the resentments it arouses be easily forgotten. "The horrors of battle may be forgotten, but the misery of a child's or a woman's suffering brands itself on the memory of generations." M. Baudouin may well be right; it may well be that the blockade will so harden the heart of the Continent against us that to mothers watching their children die of slow starvation we shall come to seem the very incarnation of the devil. And what of the effect on America? When the horrors of the famine in Europe are revealed to America by the singularly vivid messages of those supremely competent reporters who have raised journalism to the level of the arts, every humanitarian American heart will be stirred to its depths. "Think of the French, the French of all people, starving!" they will say to themselves. "We simply cannot let it happen. We *must* send them food." And then? Then American policy will conflict with British interests and possibilities arise which it is idle to discuss and better not to contemplate.

I am trying, then, to suggest two things. First, that this winter the critical moment for propaganda against Germany will come; secondly, that that moment will be seized by the Nazis to traduce the aims of Britain on the Continent and blacken the character of the British n

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America, unless we are prepared to counter-attack with a propaganda more effective than theirs.

WHAT SHALL WE SAY?

What should that propaganda be? We can, of course, say that we are fighting for colonies, for the continuance of our tribute from India, for our command of the sea, for our right to rule just over one quarter of the earth's surface and just under one quarter of its inhabitants; in a word, that we are fighting for our position as a great imperial power. We can, of course, say this, because in a measure it is true. But is it likely to win the sympathy of oppressed Europe? Is it calculated to induce its starving people to put up with their hardships in the conviction that they are suffering in a good cause? Will it seem to the people of the United States a sufficient justification for allowing French children to starve, or of the South American Republics an adequate reason for allowing their trade to be ruined by the accumulating stocks of unexported foodstuffs that will lie rotting on their quays? Will propaganda devoted to emphasizing the importance in the cosmic scheme of the continuance of the power of the British Empire really do these things? One cannot help confessing to a certain doubt.

But if this is not to be our propaganda, what should it be? The purpose of this book is to suggest an answer to this question. If it be maintained that this is the job of the Ministry of Information rather than of single individuals, I agree that this is so, but can only plead that, until such time as its familiar condition of chronic reorganization permits the Ministry to tell the world quite clearly what it is that we are fighting for, outsiders must make shift to put forward their own suggestions in the hope that they will provoke the competent authority into either confirmation or denial.

CHAPTER II

SKETCH OF THE LIBERAL
TRADITION

THE LIBERAL TRADITION

MY THESIS IS that to turn this war into a war of ideas is the best, perhaps the only, way to win it. The ideas that will win the war for us are what in the nineteenth century used to be called principles, and, more particularly, principles governing the relation of the citizen to society. In the fourth chapter I am proposing to state these principles, but before I do so I want to indicate their background, so that the reader may not suppose them to be the fruit of a certain burst of illumination in my own moderately unoriginal mind, but may see them in their historical setting as part of a tradition which embodies the common heritage of our western civilization. The tradition is one which I shall call for short the liberal tradition, using the word "liberal" to denote not the tenets of a political party now largely defunct, but a particular attitude to the individual, to the State, and to the individual's relations to the State.

NOT ALWAYS RESPECTABLE

Though the principles which I am proposing to state are to-day taken for granted among us, they are very far from having always been taken for granted. There was a time when they were considered in the highest degree subversive, and those who advocated them were regarded as dangerous revolutionaries. Original creation in art, original research in science, original thinking in morals or politics are the products not of masses of men, but of

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the minds of single men and women. Now the fact that such thinking is original causes it inevitably to appear shocking to the majority whose thinking is not original but conventional. But it does more than shock the many; it challenges the vested interests of the powerful; for the powerful *have* a vested interest in the opinions of the community, and having staked out their claim on the public ear, are naturally resentful of any squatting on such valuable property. The fact that new thought shocks the many and alarms the powerful explains why the original thinker is almost invariably abused as an outrageous, sometimes even as a blasphemous impostor. Heterodoxy in art is at worst rated as eccentricity or folly, but heterodoxy in morals or politics is denounced as propagandist wickedness which, if tolerantly received, will undermine the very foundations of society. Thus we must be prepared to find that the pioneers of the tradition which lies behind the principles I am about to state are neither so eminent nor so authoritative as its later exponents; that on the contrary they were persecuted for announcing what we now take to be commonplaces. Lest the apprehensive reader be alarmed, let me hasten to reassure him with the information that the last spokesman of the tradition whom I propose to cite is the present Leader of the House of Commons.

FROM MILTON TO MR. HOPKINSON, M.P.

I begin with Milton. Milton, writing under the Cromwellian dictatorship, is concerned for liberty. He believes that men should be free to think as they please and to tell other men what they think.

"Give me," he writes, "above all other liberties, the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to my conscience."

Later in the same century the philosopher John Locke supplies the foundation for Milton's demand. Locke, writing while the memory of the tyranny of James II was

still fresh, is concerned to emphasize the individual's basic rights. Men, he held, once lived in a state of nature in which they were free and equal. Because of their need for security, they formed society and established law for the restraint of gangsters and thugs; but societies are apt to get "above themselves" and to deprive their members of that very freedom and security, in need of which they were led to form society. Hence the importance of clearly stating the individual's rights. The following gives the gist of Locke's argument:

"The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions; for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another's pleasure."

There are four separate affirmations here: first, all men are by nature free and independent; secondly, they have certain rights, rights, namely, to life, liberty, health and possessions; thirdly, they possess these rights because they are the creatures and servants of God who so endowed them. (This third point, which links our tradition with the teaching of Christianity, is important, and I shall return to it in a moment.) Fourthly, these rights, which men possess by nature, cannot be overridden by the State, for "a Government is not free to do as it pleases . . . the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others". At the end of the eighteenth century Thomas Paine was to restate and to develop this conception of basic individual rights. Men, he says, are born "free and equal in respect of their rights", and he goes on to assert that the object of all political associations is quite simply "the preservation of the natural and

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imprescriptible rights of man; and these rights are liberty, property, security, and resistance of oppression". The founders of the recently established American colonies agreed and included in their Constitution a clause taken directly from Paine announcing that men were "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights and that among them are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness".

In view of the ever-present tendency of States to encroach upon the rights and liberties of their members, machinery for protecting these rights has to be devised. The most effective machinery for the purpose is the system known as representative government. Citizens elect representatives to Parliament to look after their interests, to voice their needs, and to make the laws by which they shall be governed. But history shows that even representative institutions are liable to "get above themselves", and to use the powers with which they have been entrusted to betray the interests which they have been elected to represent and to destroy the liberties which they have been appointed to preserve. Here, then, is the anonymous letter writer Junius writing in 1770 to the *London Public Advertiser* to protest against this betrayal of its function by a Parliament of land-owning aristocrats.

"We can never be really in danger," he writes, "until the forms of Parliament are made use of to destroy the substance of our civil and political liberties; until Parliament itself betrays its trust by contributing to establish new principles of government and employing the very weapons committed to it by the collective body to stab the constitution."

On the day on which this paragraph is written, August 8th, 1940, I detect an echo of the words of Junius in the speeches of a number of Members of Parliament inveighing against the excessive use of the secret session, and voicing their suspicions of a secret committee under the Chairmanship of Lord Swinton to supervise our home defences. Listen, for example, to Mr. Austin Hopkinson protesting in

the House of Commons against the settling up by the Government of "a new instrument of State", the Executive, which, he fears, may be used to "the great detriment of the country".

"I think," he went on, "that there is some risk of the Executive absorbing such power to infringe on our privileges to such an extent that violence and civil war will be the only way by which we can regain them. I do not want that peril to be regarded as an impossible one, though I hope it is one very far from us, because if it should arise, I can say this much—and I think I speak on behalf of many members here—that I myself will take up arms and be a leader against the usurpation by the Executive of powers which belong to Parliament."

Mr. Stokes and Mr. Maxton gave expression to similar fears. I take off my hat to Messrs. Hopkinson, Stokes and Maxton as worthy representatives of the Junius tradition.

FROM BENTHAM TO MR. ATTLEE

In the nineteenth century Jeremy Bentham announced that the object of a Government is nothing more nor less than to promote the welfare of the people who are governed. Here is his formulation of the principle, the famous principle of utility. We are, he said, to judge every action as good or bad in proportion as it "augments or diminishes the happiness of the party whose interest is in question. . . . I say of every action whatsoever; and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government".

After Bentham comes John Stuart Mill, Mill, who stated the case for representative government more clearly, and pleaded the case for liberty with an eloquence unequalled by any other representative of the tradition. If I had the money and my way, I would cause copies of Mill's *Essay on Liberty* to be distributed to every schoolboy in the land and require him to pass an examination in its principles before, at the age of twenty, I issued to him his

Charter of Adult Citizenship. I make no apology for quoting the two most famous passages in the Essay:

"If all mankind minus one," wrote Mill, "were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind. . . ." For "mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest".

I suppose that in citing Abraham Lincoln as the next witness on my list I am departing from the strictly English tradition. So much the better. The departure enables me to anticipate my coming point, that the tradition while distinctively, is by no means exclusively, English but is the tradition of good democrats all the world over. Besides, Lincoln belongs to the world and belongs, therefore, to England. Here are two characteristic utterances. The first defines the object of government.

"This," said Lincoln speaking during the American Civil War, "is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object it is to elevate the condition of men—to lift artificial weights from all shoulders, to clear the paths of laudable pursuit for all, to afford all an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race for life."

It is the object of government, in other words, to establish conditions in which, neither hampered by ignorance nor handicapped by privilege, men may develop their natural faculties and realize all that they have it in them to be. The second quotation establishes men's right to determine by what sort of government they shall be governed and, if the Government does not suit them, to change it. It is taken from Lincoln's inaugural presidential address.

"This country," he said, "with its institutions belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow

weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it."

Government, in fact, was made for man, not man for government.

The story of the liberal tradition hastens forward to the last war. Early in the war there was published a book, *Principles of Social Reconstruction*, by Bertrand Russell, which constitutes what is perhaps the most important restatement of Liberalism in our time. Here are two quotations; the first emphasizes the free and creative activity of individuals as the most important element in the good life:

"It is not only more material goods that men need," Russell writes, "but more freedom, more self-direction, more outlet for creativeness, more opportunity for the joy of life, more voluntary co-operation and less involuntary subservience to purposes not their own."

The second expresses Russell's fear of the growing authority of the State and of the threat which it constitutes to the free activity of individuals:

"The excessive power of the State, partly through internal oppression, but principally through war and the fear of war is one of the chief causes of misery in the modern world and one of the main reasons for the discouragement which prevents men from growing to their full mental stature. Some means of curing this excessive power must be found if men are not to be organized into despair as they were in the Roman Empire."

During the war itself the most distinctive contribution to British journalism—I might as justly have said, to British letters, since Massingham conformed to, indeed he evoked Shaw's definition of a really great journalist, as one "whose journalism was too good for any newspaper to make its living by"—was rendered by H. W. Massingham's weekly paper, *The Nation*. War is inevitably the enemy of the liberal tradition, and from Massingham, who did more than any

other man to keep that tradition alive during the dark days of 1914-1918, I take the following as the best statement of its meaning with which I am acquainted.

"Liberalism," he wrote, "is an invitation to freedom of the mind, to toleration, to the enrichment of personality, to the search for diversity in the social structure and in the intellectual conception of the State."

Being anxious not to overload the tradition with authorities, I pass over the period of the Armistice and come to the present. Here I content myself with a single quotation which I will take from a speech by the present Leader of the House of Commons. Speaking in 1937 Mr. Attlee warned his hearers against the threat to the liberal tradition constituted by war.

"In the necessities of modern warfare," he said, "there is at once a great danger and a great opportunity. There is a danger lest under the excuse of organizing the nation for defence and security liberty may be destroyed and the Corporate State introduced. The greater the danger, the greater the opportunity of persuading people to accept all kinds of restrictions."

These are brave words; let us hope that his present membership of the War Cabinet will not betray Mr. Attlee into unmindfulness of the dangers against which he delivered so salutary a warning when in opposition.

FOR WHAT POSTERITY WILL REMEMBER US

I have, I hope, cited enough authorities to express my conception of a continuous tradition running like a single thread through the multitudinous complexities of our political thought. It is the tradition of liberty-loving, authority-distrusting men; they are suspicious of officials, convinced that if authority is given an inch it will take an ell, and constantly vigilant lest the State forget its true office, which is to realize the ends and fulfil the purposes which its citizens have in common, and to regard *its* ends

as paramount and its citizens as raw material to be manipulated in the service of purposes not their own. The tradition runs in all civilized lands, but it is not, I hope, nationalist complacency which leads me to think that its exponents in my own country have been more numerous, vocal, and determined than in any other. This that I have called the liberal tradition is, in fact, in its political aspect predominantly an English conception, and it is in this rather than in the greatness of our Empire and the magnitude of our wealth, in our mechanical and industrial skill, or even in our administrative ability, that our distinctive contribution to civilization consists. It is certainly for this that posterity will remember us.

A NOTE ON PATRIOTISM

It is sometimes charged against the upholders of the liberal tradition that they are lacking in patriotism. As a humble follower in the same tradition, I repudiate the charge; for we, too, are lovers of our country. Ours is not the patriotism which measures national greatness in terms of wealth or territory, which reverences aristocrat or plutocrat, which prides itself on its ability to hold down a reluctant India or to add a new colony—didn't James Mill remark that the Empire was a system of outdoor relief for the younger sons of our upper classes?—which regards it as an ideal death to be hit on the head by an English baronet with a cricket bat signed by Hobbs, or which bursts with indignation in its bath at the hint of a suggestion that the most infertile square inch of all the lands upon which the sun that never sets swelters, should be transferred to the rule of some other power. Ours is a patriotism which expresses itself in the love of a country and a way of life. The country is England, an England which is a small island and not a great empire. If I may put this in my own terms and speak only for myself, I should add that the England that I love is a land of green fields, of winding lanes, of streams and copses and little hills, of market towns and cathedrals and old universities and of people who are

engaged in the immemorial pursuits of the land. It is not, that is to say, a country of great industrial cities, the workshop and the creditor of the world, holding India in fee, and maintaining a population of forty-five million instead of the eight or nine that our forefathers knew. Now this England, the *little* England that I love so much that time and again, having gone abroad for a holiday, I have come scuttling home before half of it was done in a frenzy of nostalgia for the grey skies and the soft air I know so well, this England is in danger; to think of it being violated by the Nazis fills the heart with a sick dismay. . . .

And the way of life is that of a kindly, tolerant people, not over-given to prying into their neighbours' affairs, content to live and to let live, resentful of officials, humorous, respecters of personality. In a word, it is an England which has made a success of its political life, contriving to leave to the individual a greater degree of freedom in the conduct of his private concerns than any other State, with the possible exception of ancient Athens; for though the French understand the art of living *tout court* better than any other modern people, we understand best the art of living together in society. It is because the way of life that we have built up in this island is threatened that I, like thousands of others, have abandoned a pacifism which had in me become so deep-rooted that there has been scarcely a week during the twenty years of the Armistice that I have not spoken or written against war, and subordinated my hatred of war to a hatred even fiercer, the hatred of the enslavement of the country which I love and the destruction of the way of life that seems to me to be valuable. But if we are to fight for this way of life, let us at least make clear to the world the principles upon which it rests. Let us make it clear that these *are* the principles for which we are fighting, and let us also make clear why the observance of these principles is the necessary condition of any tolerable civilization.

CHAPTER III

ORIGIN AND DECLINE OF THE LIBERAL TRADITION

IN THE LAST chapter I presented the liberal tradition as predominantly an English tradition, and it is true that for the last 300 years the English have been its chief exponents. (This claim might be honourably disputed by a Frenchman on the score of superiority in the matter of equality, and by an American—surely the most “matey” of human beings—on the score of fraternity. Nevertheless, being an Englishman, I cannot deny myself the pleasure of putting it forward.) Yet its origins are not English. Considering the lateness of our arrival upon the stage of civilization it is difficult to see how they could have been. Its origins are to be found in the two common sources of our civilization, Greece and Christianity.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE GREEKS

It was the Greeks who first taught that the object of government is the well-being of citizens. For them politics and ethics were two branches of a single study, the study of the good life for man. Ethics pursued this study directly. In so far as we are reasonable beings and not automata twitched into action by the wires of instinct and environment, our activities, Aristotle pointed out, must have a purpose or end. We cook food in order to eat, build ships in order to sail them, practise medicine in order to become doctors, and so on. Now our ends may differ in importance—it is obviously less important to achieve the end of good

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ping-pong playing¹ than that of good health. But there must be one end to which all others are subordinate, to which indeed they are means as tennis lessons are means to the end of skill in tennis playing; and the good life will consist in the successful pursuit of this one supreme and overriding end. The nature of this supreme end or goal of the good life, it is the business of ethics to determine.

THE BUSINESS OF POLITICS

Where do politics come in? Man lives in society. Clearly he must do so, if only because, being a social animal, he is miserable outside it; and not only miserable, but aborted. Conceive of a congenital Robinson Crusoe appearing by spontaneous generation on his desert island and growing up in solitude, with nobody to keep faith with and with nobody to lie to, with nobody to love and nobody to hate, with nobody to sacrifice himself for and nobody to overreach, with nobody to struggle against and nobody to compete with, with nobody to differ from and nobody to agree with; also with nobody to laugh with and sympathize with or go to shows with or talk with at night by the fireside. Such a one, it is obvious, grows up with capacities latent and faculties dormant; in particular, his moral, his political and his social attributes remain undeveloped. And since man is by nature moral and political and social, he grows up to be something less than a man. Society, then, is necessary in order that man may grow to his full stature and realize all that he has it in him to be; necessary, in order that he may become himself. But why grow to his full stature, why become himself? In order that he may live the good life. Society, then, is necessary to the living of the good life and the object of politics is nothing more nor less than to establish those conditions in which human beings can develop their specifically human natures, in order that they may pursue the good life. The purpose and justification of

¹ I say "ping-pong" advisedly; table-tennis as opposed to ping-pong has become such a formidable game that its devotees might feel inclined to question the dictum that it is less important than health.

the State is, then, to be found in something beyond the State, namely, in its effect upon the lives of the human beings who compose it. To put the point academically, politics is a means to ethics; to put it forcefully, the State is made for man, not man for the State.

But there is a further point. It is not enough that man should live in society, he must also be protected in society, protected against the activities of anti-social individuals which, if unchecked, will render civilized living impossible. The scientist cannot conduct research if his next door neighbour is abducting his wife, the musician compose while the burglar is running off with his spoons, or the writer create, if his every word is eavesdropped by the creatures of the Gestapo. In short, there must be a framework of law and order in society, if society is to perform its function of enabling individual citizens to develop their personalities in order that they may pursue the good life. Such a framework presupposes a background of force upon which it can be based. In this sense, and in this sense only, society rests upon force, force which is used not *against* its citizens, because they obey its laws unwillingly and must be compelled to obedience, but *for* them in order that the peaceable law-abiding man may be protected against the gangster and the thug. It is this necessity for force in the background of society which calls into existence the State to control it and the law to administer it. Man, said Aristotle, is a "justice needing animal" and "justice needs the State". Such, as I see it, is the contribution of the Greeks to the tradition whose development I followed in the last chapter.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIANITY

While the Greeks provide the rational justification of society, of the State and of the use of force within the State, Christianity contributes respect for the individual. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the new way of regarding the individual which Christianity introduced into the world. For the Greeks and the Romans the individual was a part of the natural order of things, finding his fulfilment

and his *raison d'être* in living the natural life as well as it could be lived. For the Christian, he was a partaker in another order and in virtue of this participation had a meaning and a status which transcended his meaning and status in the purely natural world. It was upon this supernatural meaning and status that the individual's claim to respect was based. The claim may be stated as follows: the individual personality is always and everywhere entitled to respect; he is an end in himself, and no State can ever be justified in subordinating him to its exclusive purposes.

"The individual," Hitler has written, "has no rights apart from his function as part of the State." It is in the denial of this contention that the contribution of Christianity to political thought consists. However weak, however foolish, however sinful he may be, nevertheless, Christianity insists, the individual is valuable because God made him; however insignificant, he is yet in God's eyes the equal of the highest in the land; because equally with the highest in the land he is an immortal soul made in God's image. So far as the State is concerned, then, every citizen is entitled, and entitled precisely because he is more than a citizen, to be regarded as having value equally with every other.

THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF THE STATE

But the political message of Christianity does not end here. The Christian's God is the ruler of the universe and prescribes to it its law, which is justice, mercy, compassion and love. To this law the Christian owes allegiance; if the State's law conflicts with it, so much the worse for the State's law. For this world is not the only world, nor is this life the only life. There is another world, which is spiritual, and another life, the life of the spirit, which is eternal. Through redemption by Christ's suffering every soul has the chance of participating in this eternal life. No injunction by a worldly authority can be allowed to prejudice this chance. Should it attempt to do so, the Christian has a right to disregard it.

Moreover, the Christian is endowed with a conscience which, rightly interpreted, is the voice of God speaking

within him, and telling him, if he will but give heed to it, how far the injunctions of the authorities of this world may be obeyed. The Christian, then, claims the right to say 'no' to the State, and the further right to determine when an occasion for saying 'no' has arisen. To sum up, the State, though it reigns supreme in this world, has no power in the next, nor can it have authority over that part of the individual, his immortal soul, in respect of which he is already and eternally a member of the next. Though the individual owes allegiance to the State, he owes another and a higher allegiance which may conflict with it. Though the State has authority over the individual, there are limits beyond which that authority may not be exercised. Though the State has the right to make laws and the individual the duty of obeying them, these can never be allowed to conflict with God's law of justice and mercy, or to stifle the voice of the conscience which God has implanted in man. The State, in fact, is a necessary nuisance; not, as it was for the Greeks, an instrument of human perfectibility, for sinful beings can never become perfect, nor can man's status in this world ever rise above that of an apprentice training for a better world to come, but a strait-jacket to be justified as at best a "remedy for sin".

MATURITY AND DECLINE OF THE TRADITION

For some hundreds of years the tradition based on these two foundations, the Greek and the Christian, grew and flourished, finding its appropriate witness in the long line of original teachers, thinkers and reformers from whom I quoted in the last chapter, and reaching its full maturity in late nineteenth-century England. By the end of the nineteenth century the principles in which it found expression had come to be so completely taken for granted that nobody dreamt of questioning them, if only because nobody dreamt that they existed to be questioned, so closely had they become interwoven with the texture of our national life and thought.

Reader : But what are these principles? When are they going to be stated?

Author : Have patience. They are stated at the beginning of the next chapter and when you have seen them, you will agree with me that they do not deserve a moment's impatience; indeed, you have known them all the time, since they are nothing more nor less than the string of common-places which you took in with your political mother's milk.

About fifty years ago the foundational structure of Christian and Greek ethics upon which this tradition was reared began to decay. For the decay of this foundation there were a number of reasons which, imperceptible at the time, are only now, in the retrospect of half a century, beginning to be discernible.

ECONOMIC REASONS FOR DECLINE

Partly they were economic. The structure of *laissez-faire* capitalism was being undermined and the decencies and considerations of civilized life, the impartial justice, the humanitarian laws, above all the series of legislative enactments introduced by the Liberal Governments of the early twentieth century by means of which hours of human toil were progressively diminished, wages progressively increased, education progressively extended, and restrictions progressively imposed upon the license of unrestrained predatory capitalism to endanger the lives and limbs and eat into the leisure and liberty of workers—this series of benevolent enactments began to appear in the light of crumbs dropped, from the abundance spread at the rich man's table, to secure the acquiescent contentment of his poorer brethren. When the meal ceased to be abundant, the supply of crumbs fell away. In more general terms, the conviction that government should be for the benefit of the governed and the political and social reforms introduced by Liberal and Labour Governments under the influence of this conviction, together with the apparent impartiality of the law and the visible increase in social amenity, can be represented as by-products of an age of expanding capitalism.

When for economic reasons capitalism ceased to expand, these by-products ceased to be thrown off.

RELIGIOUS REASONS FOR DECLINE

A more important cause—and here I express a purely personal view—was the decline in orthodox, religious belief. For this again there were a number of reasons; the higher criticism of the Bible, the spread of scientific knowledge about the history and the geography of the world, the growing conviction that the Church was of the rich and not of the poor, and the general scepticism of the age. As a result, there was a decline in the belief, if not in the existence of God, at least in his benevolent surveillance over human affairs. For a time the ethical principles for which Christianity provided an other-worldly backing survived, and agnostics and rationalists continued to live exemplary lives; but in the years that succeeded the war of 1914-1918 the principles which had restrained Victorians from the more obvious forms of self-indulgence and self-aggrandisement were falling everywhere into desuetude, and a generation grew to maturity which accepted with surprising unanimity the view that the maximum satisfaction of personal desires is the only satisfactory motive to conduct. In the years preceding the war this attitude was sharpened by the nightmare fear of catastrophe which, like a shutter, cut off the prospect of the future and developed into the simple injunction to eat, drink and be merry for those who, when tomorrow came, were only too likely to die.

Economic insecurity and religious decline were two of the factors which were gradually eroding the structure of traditional belief and behaviour upon which European civilization had for hundreds of years been based. For fifty years the soul of liberal civilization in Europe has been dying, and with the decay of the informing spirit, the body of Europe has also begun to collapse. Unless its spirit can be restored to it, it will fall to pieces, succumbing either to the social and political chaos resulting from years of internecine warfare, or to the slow disease of Nazi domination.

CHAPTER IV

PRINCIPLES OF THE LIBERAL TRADITION

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

IT IS TIME that I tried to formulate the principles to which reference has so frequently been made.

First, the individual is entitled to respect as an end in himself with a right to happiness in this world and a chance of salvation in the next. No claim of the State is entitled to override this right. Secondly, the State is made for man and not man for the State. Its function is to establish those conditions of order, law, security, and justice, in which alone the individual can live the good life as he conceives it, develop his personality, and realize all that he has in him to be. Thirdly, every individual has certain rights; among these are rights to liberty of action, of thought and of speech, to security from violence, to property and to health. He also has an equal right with every other citizen to such education as will fit him to make the most of his natural capacities and to render to the community the service for which he is fitted by his talents. The inventions of printing and the wireless suggest the addition of a right to such information as may be available with regard to current events and to protection against lying propaganda deliberately disseminated by authority. Fourthly, the individual should have a voice in determining the nature of the society in which he lives; through his elected representatives he should help to make the laws by which he is governed, and, if he disapproves of them, and can persuade a sufficient number of his fellow

citizens to his view, he should be entitled to change them. Fifthly, the individual should not be arrested save for offences prescribed by the law of the land. If arrested, he should not be held in prison without trial, and his trial should be by an independent judiciary.

BREVITY AND UNANIMITY

In stating the principles in this form I have had three considerations in mind. The first is brevity. The war has evoked a number of statements of the rights of twentieth century man. Of these declarations the most comprehensive is that published by the Committee which revised and amplified Mr. H. G. Wells's original statement of rights, after a period of discussion in the columns of the *Daily Herald*. This is an admirable declaration with which I am in whole-hearted agreement. In its Introduction, the Committee points out how "under the stress of the new conditions insecurity, abuses, and tyrannies increase; and liberty, particularly liberty of thought and speech, decays. Phase by phase these ill-adapted governments and controls are restricting that free play of the individual mind which is the preservative of human efficiency and happiness". It could not be better put. The number of parallel statements which have appeared in recent months show how strongly the need to re-emphasize the rights of the individual in opposition to the claims of the all-embracing State is felt. Among them I would draw special attention to a statement contained in a pamphlet published by Federal Union, entitled *How We Shall Win*, which I quote later in another connection. Both this statement and that contained in Wells's provisional Declaration of Rights are, however, too long and too elaborate for my present purpose, which is to formulate in summary form the comprehensive principles which underlie all such statements.

The second consideration is the hope of obtaining unanimity. I want the maximum of agreement for my principles, and so I have been careful to state only those which are so embedded in our political consciousness that most of us have grown up to take them for granted, so

much for granted that, until they were challenged, w^y. were unconscious that they existed as principles.

REFERENCE TO FRANCE

Thirdly, and here I come to the real point of this chapter, I want to give my statement a topical orientation, framing it with an eye, or rather, if I may be permitted the anatomical solecism, four eyes to the current situation.

The first eye opens upon France. The first four principles are founded upon the famous French Revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man made by the National Assembly of France in August, 1791. Here are the relevant passages:

"The end of political society is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, security and resistance to oppression."

In other words, the individual is an end and the State a means to that end; the individual has rights and the State's business is to preserve them. The Declaration continues:

"All citizens have a right to concur personally, or through their representatives, in making the law. Being equal in its eyes, then, they are all equally admissible to all dignities, posts and political employments."

In other words, the individual should determine the nature of the society in which he lives and should not be debarred by lack of privilege, opportunity, or education from developing his capacities to the full and attaining the position in which he can most effectively advantage himself and serve his society. I have tried to cover this part of the Declaration in my third and fourth principles. France is at present, alas, under the domination of the Nazis, having been betrayed to them by corrupt politicians. It is difficult to feel convinced that the spirit of revolutionary France animates the Vichy Government. It is no less difficult to believe that the French love of freedom and genius for equality are extinct, that nowhere is there to be found to-day a Frenchman in whose heart there survives a spark

of that passion for liberty which once swept Europe like a flame. Unless the genius of a nation can change overnight, this spirit must, it is obvious, still live, in France. It is the spirit of the real France which the puppet Government of Vichy stifles and betrays. If, as I claim, the principles I have formulated express the spirit and the ideals of the real France, to state them is to establish our claim to be fighting (at present alone) on behalf of the real France against an enemy that oppresses and a Government that betrays her.

REFERENCE TO AMERICA

The second eye opens on America. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Constitution march in step. Both were inspired by Thomas Paine. Hence the affirmations of the one are paralleled by those of the other, paralleled so closely that Lord Bryce once christened the two statements "the Apostles' Creed of Democracy". Take, for example, the following:

"We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights Governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundations on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness."

The quotation, which is from the American Declaration of Independence (July 4th, 1776), affirms that men have rights, that Governments exist to secure them, that among these rights is a right to change the Government, if it does *not* secure them, and to substitute for it one that does—in fact principles two, three, and four. These principles have been restated again and again by American statesmen. I cannot resist the temptation of again quoting Lincoln's statement.

"This country," he said in 1861, in his inaugural Presidential address, "with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it."

If, as they do, my principles express the spirit and represent the aims of the framers of the American Constitution, to publish them as our war principles establishes our claim to be fighting (at present alone—for America does not yet fight with us) for the principles to which America owes her political being.

REFERENCE TO OURSELVES

The third eye opens upon ourselves. The English know my principles by instinct and by heart, but, being inarticulate, they do not give expression to what they know. Now if for a long enough time you fail to express the truth that is in you, there comes a time when you forget the truth that you failed to express. Thus the average Englishman knows well enough that there is something wrong with the Nazis, but if you were to ask him, he would find great difficulty in saying what it is. If pressed, he would probably take refuge in some remark to the effect that he objects to Hitler's objecting to the shape of a man's nose or the colour of his hair and that the Nazi concentration camps are "a bit thick". Again, though by nature a conservative and a guardian of tradition, the average Englishman finds it difficult to put into words the tradition he guards, and is embarrassed if asked to do so. For these reasons, it is important from time to time to say what the tradition is. In the second chapter, I quoted some characteristic statements of it from the writings of its leading exponents. It was, I pointed out, a predominantly liberal tradition which reached its fullest development in the nineteenth century. In the third chapter, I exposed its origins, showing how it was rooted in the Graeco-Christian foundations of our Western civilization. But though the origins of the tradition are Greek and

Christian, though it had to wait for its full development until the nineteenth century, its earliest beginnings in this country date back to the early Middle Ages. In fact, they are to be found in Magna Carta. Take, for example, the following:

"No extraordinary scutage or aid shall be imposed on our kingdom, unless by common counsel of our government. . . .

"And for obtaining the common counsel of the kingdom anent the assessing of an aid or of a scutage, we will cause to be summoned the archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls and greater barons severally by our letters. . . ."

The quotations, from Magna Carta, represent the first step "towards the principle of Parliaments"—I am quoting from G. M. Trevelyan's *History of England*—and the principle of "'no taxation without representation'. It was a very short step, but it was the first, and it is the first step that counts". In this initial formulation of the principle of representative government we see the origin of our fourth principle.

Three more quotations from Magna Carta introduce us to our fifth:

"No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor will we send upon him except by the lawful judgment of his peers or (and) the law of the land."

"We will appoint as justices, constables, sheriffs or bailiffs only such as know the law of the realm and mean to observe it well."

What is more:

"To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay right or justice."

Trevelyan comments as follows:

"Several clauses in Magna Carta give expression to the spirit of individual liberty, as it has ever since been understood in England. And the constant repetition of these brave words in centuries to come, by persons who were ignorant of the technical meaning they bore to

the men who first wrote them down, helped powerfully to form the national character."

The national character developed considerably during the next few hundred years, but that it did not depreciate the value which the framers of Magna Carta attached to individual liberty is shown by the provisions of Habeas Corpus. This introduced no new principle into the law of England, for the right to a writ of habeas corpus already existed at common law; but the right had been too often rendered inoperative by the various subterfuges by means of which the procedure of the courts sought to evade the manifest intention of the law, with the result that, as Habeas Corpus observes—I am quoting from the Act—"many of the king's subjects" had been "long detained in prison in such cases where by law they are bailable, to their great charges and vexation". Habeas Corpus, in short, states and emphasizes my fifth principle.

To restate and publish as our war-aims the principles with which I began this chapter is to remind ourselves that our objects in this war, whatever they may have been in the last, are in the direct line of descent from the distinctive tradition of English political life, a tradition which goes back to Magna Carta, is reaffirmed in Habeas Corpus, when English liberty was threatened by the arbitrary claims of the Stuarts, is reaffirmed again at the end of the seventeenth century by John Locke under the threat of a renewal of the Stuart tyranny, is invoked again in the eighteenth century by Sir Philip Francis (Junius), John Wilkes, and Thomas Paine, against the encroachments upon the powers of the Commons by the aristocracy of landed gentry, and receives its modern form in the nineteenth century in the speeches and writings in which the Utilitarians inveighed against the continued domination of the new industrial by the remnants of the old feudal England. To-day we are faced with the greatest tyranny of all, the tyranny of a Nazi domination of this country. It is wholly in our tradition, the tradition of our historical response to the threat of tyranny, to restate the principles of the liberalism which denies tyranny.

REFERENCE TO CHRISTIANITY

The fourth eye opens upon Christianity. In appeal after appeal the Churches have insisted that this is a Christian war waged against the forces of a new paganism. Overlooking for a moment the tactlessness of addressing such an appeal to certain Mussulman nations who are at the moment of writing in a state of pre-belligerent neutrality on our side, and waiving consideration of its effect upon the Hindu, Buddhist and Mussulman Indians who are doing their best, in the face of continual snubbing and a persistent refusal to implement the professions of our war for liberty by giving them theirs, to support our war effort, we may, I think, concede that the Churches' assertion is in substance true. As to the Nazis' pretensions to be the apostles of a new paganism, I shall have something to say in the sixth chapter. My concern here is with our claim to be fighting for the principles of Christianity. Putting aside any personal doubts which I may feel, or may have felt in the past, as to whether the principles of Christianity can be established by fighting for them, whether men can devote all their energies to the task of mutilating, burning, blinding, shattering and disembowelling the enemy, whom Christ enjoined them to love, without negating the spirit of His teaching, and whether, while professing to accept Christ's message we are justified in ignoring His oft-repeated injunction that means condition ends, and that you cannot ensure good ends as, for example, peace and goodwill among men by bad means such as hating and hurting them—putting aside, I say, all these doubts as being in the highest degree inconvenient in wartime, I am disposed to admit the Churches' claim.

IN WHAT SENSE IS THE WAR FOR CHRISTIANITY?

At least, I am disposed to admit it, in so far as we really *are* fighting for the establishment of the principles I have cited. For while all five are conformable with Christian tradition, the first derives directly from the teaching of

Christ—how directly I have tried to show in the last chapter—pointing out that the new political doctrine which Christianity introduced into the world was the duty of respect for the individual as such, a respect born of the conviction that the individual is an immortal soul made by the Creator in His own image. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this contribution of Christianity to political thought. Because of it, slaves have been freed, the crueller forms of punishment such as hanging, drawing and quartering discontinued, and in Christian countries torture as a means of securing confession has been abandoned. It is interesting to see how, as Christianity is allowed to lapse or is definitely repudiated, the practice of torture creeps back, as it has crept back in Germany and in Russia. The Christian doctrine of respect for the individual has also played its part in initiating the humanitarian legislation of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth. The Trade Boards Acts, the Unemployment and Health Insurance Acts, the Factories Acts, the Old Age Pensions Acts, indeed all that legislation which has sought to enlighten man's ignorance and to relieve his drudgery, treating him not as an instrument of the profit of others, but as an end in himself, entitled to self-development, to leisure, to education, to a decent economic competence and a secure old age, derive their inspiration from this Christian principle. It is, I think, only prejudice which would overlook, as so many agnostics are apt to do, the substantial influence which the distinctively Christian sentiments, as, for example, the desire to ameliorate the lot of our fellow men *because* they are immortal souls made in the image of God, and *because* they are our neighbours whom we are enjoined to love as ourselves, have had in improving human life and especially the lives of those human beings who have been afflicted or oppressed. Charity, mercy and compassion are the distinctively Christian virtues. Let us not minimize the part they have played in improving man's life upon this earth, both by the legislation they have inspired and the intercourse they have sweetened.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE RIGHT TO SAY "NO"

The principles of Christianity touch those of politics at three further points. First, Christianity supports the individual in his refusal to say "yes" to the State. The doctrine of Nazi Germany—I shall try to summarize it in Chapter VI—maintains that the Leader can do no wrong, if only because the Leader is himself the creator of right. "Justice and Hitler's will are one and the same thing," Field-Marshal Goering informed the Public Prosecutor a year after the Nazis came to power; "What Hitler decides is right and will remain eternally right," said Herr Wagner, ex-Bavarian Minister of the Interior in 1936. It follows that to say "no" to Hitler is to commit not only a political but a moral offence; it is to offend against justice and right. If to say "no" to Hitler is to offend against morality, it is also to commit a moral and not merely a political offence to say "no" to the State which carries out the will of Hitler, and it is to commit a moral and not merely a legal offence to say "no" to the law which carries out the will of the State. Now Hitler's claim to prescribe what is right and what wrong is based upon power. It is successful force, which, as we shall see in Chapter VI¹, confers, according to the Nazi philosophy, not only might but right. It is almost as if the Nazis said—one of them has in fact said—"Might is right and quite rightly". Now if you repudiate the doctrine that power confers right, you also repudiate the view that Hitler is at once the creator and arbiter of morality merely because he happens to possess the power to enforce his will, and the fact that you *do* repudiate it means in the last resort that you deprive him of the power to enforce his will. Repudiating the doctrine that might confers right, you also repudiate its corollary that it is a moral offence to say "no" to Hitler. You assert, on the contrary, that it may even be a moral offence to say "yes" to Hitler. For in addition to Hitler there is also God—in spite of the assertion of Herr Spaniel (Nazi Leader in the Saar)

¹ See Chapter VI, p. 69

that "Hitler is a new, a greater and a more powerful Jesus Christ", Church Minister Kerri's addendum that "Adolf Hitler is the real Holy Ghost", and the announcement of a Nazi leader that "to serve Hitler is to serve God", we are not, I think, as yet justified in assuming his identification with the *third* member of the Trinity—in addition to Hitler's law there is also God's law, and in addition to God's law there is also the individual conscience, which is God's voice.

Once the fact that Hitler is *not* God and that the service of Hitler is *not* the service of God is conceded, we must also concede that the dictates of conscience may bid the individual give heed to God's law, which is justice and mercy, and to refuse to give heed to Hitler's, which is violence and oppression; and we must add that to refuse to hearken to the voice of conscience in a case where God's law and Hitler's conflict is to commit an offence against God.

It is on these lines that the Christian argues, and the conclusion of his argument requires him in certain circumstances to repudiate the fiat of State-constituted authority and to acknowledge only the authority of his conscience. It is significant that in Germany one of the most persistent and courageous of the many "oppositions" to the Nazis has been the opposition of the German Confessional Church, an opposition based on strictly Christian principles. The Confessional Church in Germany is not a clandestine political opposition party, it is a moral opposition which denies the Nazis' thesis that power gives right and entitles its holder to determine right and wrong. For such determination is not of man, but of God. It is in this faith that Pastor Niemöller went to prison; it is in the same faith that thousands are to-day languishing in concentration camps. All this and much more is implied in our principle that the individual is an end in himself and the State merely a means to the realization of that end.

CHRISTIANITY AND DEMOCRACY

Secondly, many of us are coming to realize the connection—I will not say the necessary connection, for the Athenians after all were democrats—between Christianity and

democracy, and to see that it may not be wholly a coincidence that the decline of democracy in the West has synchronized with the decline of Christianity. The subject raises many issues which cannot be discussed here. I content myself with two observations: (a) There are certain virtues which democracy represents, respect for personality, faith in equality, desire for truth, trust in free discussion, tolerance of difference, love of freedom, hatred of cruelty. I do not mean that democracy practises these virtues; far from it. But it does hold them to be virtues, and sometimes it has practised some of them. The world has no doubt a long way to go before its practices square with its professions, but the first step is for its professions to condemn its practices, and this, at least, the professions of democrats have done. The virtues I have named are the essence of democracy; all else is machinery. They are also the virtues which Christianity praises. I do not mean that Christians practise them; far from it; but Christians do hold them to be virtues and some Christians have certainly tried to practise some of them. In short, the ideals of democracy and Christianity are the same. The ideals of Fascism and Christianity are emphatically not the same.

(b) It is a commonplace that the dictatorships have been able to arouse enthusiastic support among their adherents. Only religion has been able to awaken an equivalent enthusiasm in the past; indeed, Fascism and Communism have come, in the hearts of many of the present generation, to usurp the place which religion held in the hearts of their fathers. They evoke the same aggressiveness, the same self-sacrifice, the same unthinking acceptance of doctrines and ideas, the same willingness to supply the place of knowledge by converting conjectures into dogmas, the same readiness to kill and to suffer in defence of the dogmas. Democracy in the modern world arouses no similar response. Compared with its modern rivals, its face is old and tired, its fires burn low and evoke no answering spark in the hearts of its supporters. It is difficult to believe that, had democracy been for them a living creed, its adherents in one continental country after another could have gone down so easily before the Fascists.

The question then arises, how is democracy in this country and in the United States to resist the onslaught of these fierce new creeds, unless it can evoke an enthusiasm which is not less than that which they command? How, in short, can it oppose the new religions, unless it can draw upon the energy and enthusiasm which only religion can supply? One may be pardoned for doubting whether democracy can to-day stand up to the Fascists, supported only by a vague belief in God or a tepid respect for the humanitarian values, combined with a gentlemanly preference for decency over barbarism.

If there is any validity in my suggestion that democracy can survive only if it can succeed in calling religion to its assistance, the question next arises, in what direction is it to look for its religious ally, if it is not to Christianity? It may, of course, be objected that the Christianity to which I am appealing no longer exists, that it is a dead religion, or so near its death that it cannot revive and again become a living faith to quicken the heart of man. I do not believe this. I believe that Christianity can still re-create the spirit of its original impulse; but to do so, it must again become a revolutionary faith. It is as a revolutionary faith that it must be presented to the modern generation, not as a spiritual bath-chair in which a decadent age wheels about its sick conscience. On this supposition, but only on this supposition, it can powerfully assist the task of weaning the world back to democracy. In any event, the cause of democracy and the cause of Christianity are bound together; if the one falls, the other falls with it. Now the fourth and fifth of my principles are basic principles of democracy; they are also, I suggest, such as Christianity should support.

CHRISTIANITY AND RIGHTS

Thirdly, there is the question of rights. I have pointed out how the conception of the natural possession of rights by the individual springs in part from the conception of the individual as God's creature made in His image. The State does not, according to the liberal tradition, confer these rights; it only confirms them. Now the Nazis do not

concede either that men are born free and equal, or that they have rights. For example, the Nazis regard the Jews as sub-human; they make no secret of the fact that they hold all coloured peoples and most white ones to be inferior to themselves, whose only *raison d'être* is to serve the purposes of the superior race. Thus they have officially stated that, if their colonies are restored to them, they will withhold higher education from the natives. What do those who are naturally assigned by the colour of their skins to the rôle of hewers of wood and drawers of water, want with higher education?

Well, why not? What answer can we make to the Nazis' claim? I can think of no reason why not, unless we accept the view that men and women are born free and equal with a right to develop their talents and a claim to be treated as ends in themselves. Now not only are these cardinal tenets of Christianity; it is difficult to see how they can be supported, unless Christianity be accepted. For what answer am I to give to the questions, "Why is the individual entitled to respect?" "Why has he a right of self-development?" unless I am prepared to say that that is how God made him and endowed him.

SUMMARY

I have tried to show from four points of view the importance of the principles of the liberal tradition and of publishing these principles: first, because of their appeal to the French, secondly, because of their appeal to the Americans, thirdly, because they express the spirit of the English, and fourthly, because they embody the political teaching of Christianity and make good, therefore, our claim to be fighting for Christianity against barbarism. If these are not the principles for which we are fighting, then for what, in God's name, are we fighting? If they are, what possible ground can there be for not saying so? There is, after all, nothing shameful in the principles. . . .

There is a fifth point of view, the point of view of the peoples now under Nazi rule. What would be the effect of a statement of these principles upon them? The answer to this question demands a chapter to itself.

CHAPTER V

PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN
REVOLUTION

GLANCE AT THE MILITARY SITUATION

I COME TO THE most immediately topical part of my thesis, the potentialities of the liberal principles as a war-winning weapon. First, a glance at the military situation. I make no pretension to possessing the qualifications which are necessary for its appraisal. But one does not need qualifications to realize certain obvious truths. Let us suppose that the threatened invasion has been made and has failed; or that it has not been made and that the war settles down to a struggle of bombing and blockade. At some time, it may be in 1941 or it may be in 1942—Mr. Churchill has mentioned both years—it may be hoped that we shall have sufficiently outstripped the Germans in the production of aeroplanes, to have achieved the mastery of the air. At this point it may be presumed we shall be in a position to take the offensive. Now it is generally agreed that aeroplanes alone cannot win wars, for, though the aeroplane can damage towns and kill civilians, it cannot occupy territory. If a decision is to be gained, the victorious aeroplanes must be supported by troops in the field. There must, then, at some stage be an army of European invasion. If we are trying to win the war by our own unaided efforts, this army of European invasion will be a purely imperial army. We, that is to say, Great Britain and its Empire, will be committed to convoying across the Channel and to landing on the shores of a presumably hostile France, in the face of presumably violent enemy

opposition, an expeditionary force. As the task of this force will be to reconquer those parts of Europe now under Nazi domination and, in the end, to invade Germany itself, it will need to be of very considerable dimensions, consisting of not less than five or six million men. It will need to be considerably larger, that is to say, than the army which we transported to a friendly France during the whole period of the last war. Moreover, such a force must be equipped with the most modern instruments of warfare since we cannot afford the fiasco of another Norwegian expedition. We shall also, then, be committed to the task of transporting to Europe several thousand 75-ton tanks. . . . Now this transport of troops and tanks is a formidable undertaking, and it is permissible to doubt whether we shall be able to equip and convoy the requisite number, whether we can successfully land them in the face of Nazi opposition, and whether, if we do, we can expect them to conquer the whole of Western and Central Europe; it is permissible to doubt, in other words, whether the war can be won along these lines.

HOW CAN THE INVADERS SECURE A WELCOME

It may be said that the populations of those countries at present oppressed by the Nazis will rise up everywhere to welcome the English as deliverers. Possibly, possibly not. But we cannot count on it. It must be remembered that for one or it may be for two winters the populations of the countries concerned will have suffered under the rigours of the British blockade; that all will have gone short, that some may even have starved; that epidemics may have aggravated the miseries of famine, and that during the whole of this period Nazi propaganda will have enjoyed an opportunity, unhampered by the presence of any rival in the field, of representing the blockade as the work of devils making war on women and children, and seeking to starve into surrender those whom they

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have not the courage to meet or the skill to conquer in the open field. In so far as this propaganda is successful, the subject populations will see in the invaders those who are directly responsible for the sufferings of themselves and their families. It cannot, I think, be taken for granted that they will rush to welcome them with open arms.

Nevertheless, they can, I think, be induced to do precisely this; induced, that is to say, not only to welcome but to assist the invaders, not only not to support the Nazis, but to rise up and compass their overthrow, provided that one condition is satisfied; and the condition is that this war should be represented to them not as one of rival nationalisms, but as one of rival ideologies. We must somehow contrive to convince them that this is not a struggle on the part of England to retain her empire against Germany's attempt to wrest it from her, but a struggle to save civilization against a barbarism that would destroy it. If we can do this, then all those who on the Continent of Europe hate oppression, love liberty, and care for civilized ways of living will rally to our aid, and instead of imposing upon an army of a few million British the task of invading unassisted, at best an apathetic and at worst an antagonistic Europe, we may expect their invasion to be the signal for a series of revolutionary risings against the Nazis, until the whole of Western and Central Europe, from Narvik to Czechoslovakia, and from Poland to France is in a flame of revolt. We must, then, if we are to win this war, turn it into a war of European revolution. To this end, it is required of us that we should stand forth before all men as the manifest champions of democracy and the rallying ground of the forces of freedom all the world over.

THE POTENTIAL ARMY OF EUROPEAN REVOLUTIONS

Now it would, I think, be an illusion to suppose that it is in this light that the Continent at present regards us.

Some, change, then, in our political appearance and reputation must be effected. What change and how effected? The change involved in substituting ideas and principles for territories and markets as our acknowledged war aims, and convincing the world that the substitution is genuine. What should these ideas and principles be? They are, I suggest, precisely those that I have summarized in the previous chapter as the principles of democracy, representative government and political freedom.

It is difficult to suppose that the ideals of democracy, representative government and freedom, are wholly dead upon the Continent; that in social-democratic Czechoslovakia, that in liberal Holland and bourgeois Belgium, that in republican France, that in a Germany which, less than eight years ago, was casting a majority of votes for social democracy and against Hitler, there nowhere survives a man who desires and demands the right to govern himself and to order his private life as he thinks fit. It is obvious that there must be millions of such men. Our purpose should be to turn them into Fifth Columnists working against Hitler in all the countries which the Nazis dominate. These potential Fifth Columnists must be given a focus and rallying-point which can be found only in this country.

It is in the framework of this setting that one realizes the importance of representing England to the world as the manifest defender of the ideals which democrats and free men all over the world have in common. In other words, Czechoslovakians and Norwegians and Frenchmen and Belgians and Dutch, whom an appeal to fight for the British Empire, for British privileges, or for British tribute would leave indifferent or hostile, would respond to an appeal to fight for freedom against oppression, for the right of the free individual against the all-embracing claims of the State, and for representative government against police law.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO NAZISM

Granted that the argument is so far valid, what follows? There follows, first, an objective for our propaganda. It is not enough to attack the existing régime in Germany; we must propose an alternative. This alternative régime should conform to the principles that have been laid down, and the point should be stressed that, since the principles are common to all anti-Nazis, the alternative is one to which all anti-Nazis can subscribe. Such an alternative requires, I suggest, a declaration coveting two points. First, it must define the status rights, needs and duties of individual men and women in the twentieth century and their relation to the State in the new society which will follow this war; secondly, it must make proposals governing the relations between States. On the second point I shall have something to say in the last chapter; I am here concerned only with the first, which brings me back once more to the principles of the liberal tradition.

THAT PRINCIPLES ARE OLD BUT THEIR APPLICATIONS ARE NEW

These principles prescribe the necessary conditions of any tolerable relation between the individual and the State in all countries and at all times. Nevertheless, their application requires to be worked out afresh to meet the changed circumstances of a new age. For example, it was not until the invention, first of the newspaper and then of the wireless, had given human lying an enlarged scope and enabled men to exploit the printing press and the ether as new mediums for their vices, that it became necessary to insist on the citizens' right of protection against false information and lying propaganda. The fact that the circumstances of our time have changed with such rapidity that the world in which we live has, during the last hundred years, altered more radically and more rapidly than during the whole of the preceding two thousand, coupled with the great and growing encroachments which the State has

made upon the individual's life and liberty during the last twenty years, has rendered an up-to-date application of the principles of liberalism long overdue. Mr. H. G. Wells has as usual been quick to realize the need and seize the opportunity it presents and has, in his "Provisional Declaration of the Rights of Man", drawn up a wholly admirable statement of what the principles bestow in the way of rights and entail in the way of duties for the twentieth century citizen. There is nothing to be gained by repeating here Wells's Declaration which, revised and amplified by Lord Sankey's drafting committee, appears in its completed form in Wells's recently published Penguin, *The Commonsense of War and Peace*.

A CHARTER FOR TWENTIETH CENTURY MAN

At the same time, I am sensible of the obligation to give content to my assertion that the principles of the liberal tradition require a new application in the light of the special circumstances of our time, and I propose, therefore, to print here a statement entitled, "A Draft Charter for Twentieth Century Man", which originally appeared in a pamphlet entitled *How We Shall Win the War*, recently published by Federal Union. I venture to include this statement, partly because I had some hand in the drafting of it and its appearance here enables me, therefore, to conform to the admirable principle that the contents of a book should, so far as possible, be by its author, and partly because it will serve as a bridge between the accepted principles with whose application I have hitherto been concerned, and a new principle which I hope to introduce in the last chapter of this book, enabling me to slip in the new principle, which is still in the subversive and controversial stage, under cover of the admitted respectability of the old without anybody except the reader, whom I am expressly taking into my confidence, knowing that I have done so. There follows, then, a draft Charter for twentieth century man.

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Man has 'certain needs and certain rights.'

HIS NEEDS

Peace
Security
Work
Leisure

HIS RIGHTS

Equality of Opportunity in Education, for Work and for Leisure.

Self-Expression in speech and writing.

Access to the Speech and Writings of others.

Access to true information and protection against misleading official propaganda.

Freedom from arrest save for offences prescribed by law, from imprisonment without trial, from trial by biased or Party courts, and from physical and mental torture.

Freedom to change his Government by peaceful means.

The Purpose of the State is to fulfil these Needs and to Safeguard these Rights.

The State, therefore, has certain duties to the individual. They are:

To plan for peace by the surrender of sovereign powers to a Federal Government.

To plan for prosperity and the common welfare.

To guarantee the citizen against violence.

To guarantee suitable occupation and reasonable leisure.

To guarantee such education as will enable the citizen to make the most of his talents.

To guarantee a free Press and a truthful Radio news service.

The Citizen of a State which fulfils this purpose owes certain Obligations. They are;

To serve the community to which he belongs.

To participate in the choice of its government and the conduct of its affairs.

To keep himself informed in regard to men and affairs so that he will be able to participate effectively and to choose wisely.

I put it to you that this Charter states with a reasonable degree of comprehensiveness the needs of twentieth-century man, defines his basic rights and lays down the conditions for his tolerable existence in a civilized society. Moreover, all its provisions fall within the framework of the principles stated in the previous chapter, principles which, I have suggested, constitute the common heritage of our western civilization.

THE STRATEGY OF EUROPEAN REVOLUTION

Having tried, to bring up to date the principles for which it should be fought, I return to the exposition of my main thesis, the thesis of a revolutionary war. Granted that the argument hitherto followed is valid, granted that its conclusion requires us to offer a constructive alternative to the Nazi regime, if we are to encourage Europe to revolt, and granted that something on the lines of this Charter of the rights of Twentieth-century Man provides us with the foundation for such an alternative, what else follows? There follows the question of method, or more precisely, of advertisement. Somehow we have to make known to the peoples of the Continent the fact that we are fighting for the establishment of a European order which accepts and incorporates the Charter, and that this, and nothing less than this, is our constructive war aim. What, then, should the method of advertisement be? Any full consideration of the answer to this question falls outside the scope of this book which is concerned with principles; nor, indeed, have I the competence or the training which such consideration would require. I confine myself, therefore, to mentioning a few obvious points.

First, we should make an appeal for active service by liberals on the Continent in the common cause against Nazism by publishing our statement of principles and their modern application as the official aim of the British war effort. Secondly, we should avail ourselves of the services of prominent anti-Nazis in this country. It is they, not we, who will determine the best method of fomenting revolution

in their own countries. I suggest, then, that an advisory council consisting of representatives of the subjugated States be formed to advise the British Government on this aspect of the war. We should enlist the services of anti-Nazis here not only to broadcast to their own countrymen a statement of the principles for which we are fighting, but to take a more active and, it may be, a more dangerous part in the struggle for their realization. Volunteers should be invited to go as agents into Nazi occupied territories. It is conceivable that they might be dropped at night by parachutes in those areas in which they are known to have special influence, in order that they might assist the underground anti-Nazi movement. They would bring to peoples cut off from foreign news, accounts of the nature and the strength of the British war effort, of the degree of American help, of the growing strength of the British Air Force, of the impossibility of breaking the blockade and of the impossibility, therefore, of German victory, of the stores of food purchased by the British Government ready to be distributed to the famine-stricken peoples of Europe, directly the Nazis had been driven out, of an English offer of union with whatever peoples make common cause with this country against the Nazis (more of this later).

FORMATION OF ANTI-NAZI FIFTH COLUMNS

Thirdly, we should endeavour, through the mediation of exiled leaders of the anti-Nazi movement now in this country, to get into touch with key men in the various countries at present under German rule, who would be willing to take the risk of acting as instigators at first of secret disaffection and later of open revolt. Hitler has himself told us of the part Fifth Columnists have played in the countries which he has proposed to invade in paving the way for his success; it was a part so large, that the invasion when it came, was little more than the culmination of a process which had already been at work for months, in some cases even for years. It remained for Hitler's invading troops only to deliver the *coup de grâce* to a structure which

had already been undermined from within. "We shall not shrink," Dr. Rauschning reports Hitler as saying, "from the plotting of revolutions. We shall have friends who will help us in all the enemy countries. . . . Of course you know the history of revolutions. It is always the same: the ruling classes capitulate. Why? Defeatism. They no longer have the will to conquer. The organization of revolution, this is the secret of the new strategy."

Quite so. Hitler has been as good as his word. He has not only told us, he has shown us how to do it. The Fifth Columnists in Norway and Holland, Belgium and France were Hitler's secret weapon employed by him with immense effect to make straight the way of the conqueror. We should not be too proud to take a leaf out of his book and explicitly recognize this for the political war that it has now become, by organizing our own Fifth Columnists to co-operate with the armies of invasion and synchronize revolution from within with attack from without.

I would suggest the formation of a special department in this country staffed mainly by refugees to organize these Fifth Column activities. The Gestapo is said to possess dossiers of the records not only of Nazi enemies but of Nazi sympathizers in all the countries with which the Nazis have relations. The department for the organization of overseas revolution would fill the role of a counter Gestapo working underground throughout Europe and enlisting every malcontent to assist in the task of undermining oppression.

THE THREE ARROWS

It would be worth while in this connection to consider the utility of adopting a universal anti-Nazi badge to serve as a symbol for anti-Nazi sympathizers of whatever nationality. In the days before Hitler's revolution, members of the Iron Front in Germany adopted the symbol of three white arrows arranged horizontally and pointing slightly downwards from right to left. Thirty million of these white arrow badges were said to have been manufactured; they

were worn in buttonholes, as flags on bicycles, on cigarette cases, even on the soles of people's shoes. They were to be found in buses and on café tables, on door plates and broadcast in the roads. It was the misfortune of the movement for a united front to secure the overthrow of the Nazis that it came too late. That the democratic opposition to Hitler is not dead, the recent appearance of the sign of the three arrows chalked on the walls of German factories—a case has recently been reported by a neutral observer from Dusseldorf—bears witness. There is much to be said for the suggestion that our own forces should adopt the same design. The advantages are obvious. First, the appearance of the three white arrows on British tanks and aeroplanes would indicate that we were fighting for the common cause of democracy and not merely for the British Empire. Secondly, it would demonstrate to the forces of opposition all over Europe, and especially in Germany itself, that their cause was ours. Thirdly, it would serve to mitigate the hostility which it is inevitable that men should feel for those whom they conceive to be bombing and starving their wives and children, by the assurance that they and theirs were suffering in the same cause as that which once induced them to join the German Freiheit. Finally, it would encourage the forces opposed to Hitler in all countries with the knowledge that, though they might appear scattered and weak, they were nevertheless part of a continent-wide movement led from Britain. It has been proposed that each of the three arrows should be identified with a separate slogan. Suggestions—I take them gratefully from an admirable article by Paul Reilly in the *News-Chronicle*—are: (1) No surrender to or compromise with Fascism anywhere; (2) People before Property; (3) A world beyond war.

SUMMARY

To sum up, what should be aimed at is the creation on the Continent of an international army of liberty-loving men, united by their hatred of Nazi oppression, who are prepared to work everywhere against the Nazis and, when

the time comes, to co-operate with the forces of invasion to free Europe from the Nazi yoke. They would be composed of men who would be prepared at first to plan in secret and presently to fight in the open for liberty, for democracy, and for a new order of society to be realized in a world from which Hitler had passed like a bad dream. To create this international army of collectives, democratic opposition should be one of the cardinal objectives of our policy. Meanwhile an anti-Nazi legion should be formed from among the refugees in this country pledged to fight not for the victory of the British Empire, but for the realization of the principles which are common to democrats all the world over.

I am conscious of the inadequacy of the immediately foregoing paragraphs. As I have said, the strategy of revolution does not strictly fall within the province of this book and it might have been better to omit any treatment of matters of which I have neither the competence nor the authority to speak; but although revolutionary strategy lies outside the competence of the author, it is certainly not outside the confines of his subject, and it seemed to me that I ought to indicate, however briefly and inadequately, the sort of lines upon which, granted that my principles and their applications are accepted as war aims, propaganda in Europe ought to proceed.

JOHN BULL AS A REVOLUTIONARY FIGURE?

At this point, however, an objection presents itself. Is this country, it may be asked, really capable of initiating and conducting such a policy of European revolution? The question is very much to the point. Not less to the point is the further question, do continental peoples believe that it is capable or can be induced to become so? It must, I think, be freely admitted that John Bull does not look like a revolutionary figure; that jovial, rubicund countenance has been designed for a different role; that square, common-sensible head may fit into a bowler or a topper, but scarcely into the Phrygian cap of revolution. Nor has our record in

recent years, our connivance at Fascist successes in Abyssinia and Spain, our refusal to assist the Spanish Republican Government, our betrayal of Czech democracy, our manifest disinclination to take action against the Japanese in Manchuria, lent colour to the conception of John Bull as the standard-bearer of democracy, the hater of tyranny, the friend of popular movements, and the champion of liberty-loving men wherever they are to be found. All this is true. The figure that England has cut in the eyes of the Continent since the last war is an inglorious one, inglorious enough to justify many of Hitler's jibes against the plutocracies. We have played the part of an old, tired nation unmoved by any unselfish impulse, deaf to appeals to our chivalry and our generosity. Even our traditional asylum to the exiled and oppressed has been grudgingly offered, and in too many cases flatly refused. Again our support of collective security, such as it was, wore a self-interested air, and in its later years, when it came to be completely dominated by ourselves and the French, the League looked like nothing so much as a trade union of two old burglars grown respectable on the proceeds of past loot and desperately anxious to discourage any new recruits to their late profession.

All this and much more in the same vein is true, and had won for us at the beginning of this war an unenviable reputation for vacillation and reaction.

DO WE BELIE OUR REPUTATION ?

Nevertheless, it is possible to believe that this reputation belies our history. For assuredly we were not always so. There was a time not so long ago when England was known as the champion of lost causes, the friend of the oppressed, the home and refuge of the free. In the great days of Palmerston and Canning and Melbourne, still more in those of Gladstone, England was looked upon as the natural leader of the liberals of Europe. England had been the first to clip the wings of her own aristocratic monarchs, the first to set up representative institutions, the first to accomplish the transition from an aristocratic to a bourgeois

economy and to accomplish it without revolution. England was the birthplace of Milton and John Locke and Thomas Paine and Junius and Wilkes and Bentham and Mill and Bright and Cobden, and the other spokesmen of the liberal tradition. England was the home of free democracy. Small wonder that under Gladstone she should have supported the struggle of oppressed peoples to be free and ranged herself on the side of democratic movements wherever they might arise. Such was our nineteenth-century reputation, a reputation which, I would suggest, was due to our adherence to that liberal tradition which I described in the second chapter.

Even to-day it is difficult to avoid being moved by the feelings of admiration which the refugees, who during the last seven years have again found an asylum, albeit suspicious and unfriendly one, in this country, entertain for the continuing strain of liberalism in the English tradition.

WHAT THE REFUGEES ADMIRE

It is our easy tolerance of notions and ways of life not our own, our willingness to live and to let live, our impatience of rules and our attitude of tolerant amusement to the people whose business it is to carry them out, that impresses the foreigner to-day, as it has traditionally impressed him in the past. With what mingled admiration and astonishment refugees observe the spectacle of the orators at the Marble Arch who, Sunday after Sunday, pour the most outrageous sentiments into the ears of tolerantly receptive or mildly derisive crowds. Where else, they ask themselves, are officials received with such cavalier indifference? Where else are regulations treated with such casual disregard? We are forbidden to walk upon the grass, and, lo and behold, we walk upon it and nothing very much seems to happen. We are told that if we trespass, we shall be prosecuted; we do trespass and no prosecution follows. We are not easily put upon. When authority tries to throw its weight about, we are moved to derision rather than to awe. We are prone to laugh at pomp and to prick the bubble of self-importance with a jibe. Like the Greek gods, we are for ever on the

look out for those who show a tendency to grow too big for their boots. During the General Strike of 1926 all available means of transport were commandeered either by the Government or by the T.U.C. Lorries in particular seemed to belong exclusively to the T.U.C. and drove about everywhere adorned with notices announcing that they were "Driven by Permission of the T.U.C." Walking down the Strand, I observed a lorry of vast dimensions, driven by a small, wiry man whose untidy hair which bristled all over his head was belied by the pointed ends of his waxed moustache, on the bonnet of his engine was hung a large notice informing the world that the lorry was "Driven By My Own Bloody Permission".

Now all this, as I say, foreigners, especially those of German origin brought up to respect authority and to accept interference, find very surprising and very charming. They would like, many of them, to see their own country adopt a similar "Go as you please"; so, at least, they say, when they talk to us. However this may be, and whether they really like this sort of thing or are only pretending to like it to please us, they are convinced that we like it very much. This easy-going attitude to life, this freedom from restrictions and impatience of authority is what they take to be distinctively English. It is for these things that they believe us to be fighting.

THE OBTVERSE OF THE ENGLISH MEDAL

Perhaps they are only being polite to their hosts when they say gratifying things about us; perhaps they are unaware of the obverse of the medal, on the bright side of which I have so exclusively dwelt; perhaps they do not realize that the tolerance of opinions is in part due to an indifference to ideas; that many Englishmen think freely because they do not think at all, and that when other Englishmen think, they think they are sick. Perhaps they do not see that the good humour is often a cloak for laziness—it is too much trouble to take anything seriously, so one may as well dismiss it with a joke—and that the national *laissez faire* expresses itself in a refusal to plan, which has

turned our countryside into an architectural shambles and caused the beautiful face of England to come out in irritable spots of angry pink, for all the world as if it had caught a rash of villas—it is possible, I say, that they do not realize these things. And yet I think that they do, and that nevertheless it is not *merely* politeness which leads them to speak so warmly of our liberty-loving ways—unless, of course, we intern them, when they speak of them no longer.

THAT WE CAN REGAIN OUR REPUTATION

I am expanding in this apparently digressive way on the English attitude to life because it enables me to implement my contention that even now, in spite of the melancholy record of the last twenty years, we are still looked upon as the liberty-loving nation *par excellence* of Europe, and the relevance of the contention lies in the fact that, if circumstances demand it of us, we shall not find it so difficult to become the focus of liberal thought and to assume the leadership of democratic revolutionary movements on the Continent, as those who fix their eyes only on our recent past might suppose. National reputations are an unconscionable time in dying, and the legend of democratic liberty-loving England is one of them.

Now this precisely is the role which circumstances do require of us, the plain truth of the situation being that, unless we are willing to assume it, we shall not win this war. It has been said that Englishmen will not face a situation though they will always stand up to it. Because of our prolonged refusal to face it as it developed, the situation is now on top of us and nothing less than “standing up” will do. That there is considerable prospect of our being willing to assume the role for which I have cast us, the changing trends of opinion in this country during the last few months afford encouraging testimony.

THE CHANGING TRENDS OF OPINION

Since the collapse of France the mind of England has suffered a profound change. Our declared purpose on

entering this war was to restore the independence of Poland and Czechoslovakia. Then the royal families of Norway and presently Holland were added to the restoration list. The war, in fact, became a crusade to restore the status quo of 1939, or rather, since it was conceded on all hands that the Nazis must go if ever again there was to be peace in Europe, the status quo of 1933.

It was only after it became increasingly evident that European revolution was a condition of victory, that it began to develop into a war of ideologies. There were, of course, from the first many people who realized that we could not, even if we wished it, go back to the pre-war world. Moreover, they did not wish it. The Europe of the Versailles settlement, especially in its later phases with its booms and slumps, its paradox of 'want in the midst of plenty, its accumulating millions of unemployed, above all with its nightmare fear of war spreading across the horizons of men's lives, was not such an attractive place, that after the world had been turned upside down, we should turn it upside down again in order to restore it to its original condition. Hence, there was from the first a considerable body of opinion which envisaged a peace at once more drastic in its changes and constructive in its proposals than one whose ideals were confined to the restoration of the independence of European States or the restoration of the sovereignties of royal families.

THE NATIONAL PEACE COUNCIL'S PROGRAMME FOR A NEW SOCIAL ORDER

To take an example from the propaganda of one body with which I happen to be personally associated, where I could name a dozen, the National Peace Council was putting forward in the early spring of 1940 proposals for a new social order after the war which carried us very far indeed. Here are some of them:

1. The achievement of economic reconstruction and a fuller economic co-operation in Europe and throughout the world. To a Europe in which Nazi domination is eliminat-

ing political and economic barriers, such a plan would offer unity in freedom and prosperity—a new Europe whose structure would conform to the need for an uninterrupted intercourse of goods and services; whose currencies would be co-ordinated; whose fields, factories and mines would be busy in the development of resources for the main purpose of increasing the standard of living of all its peoples;

2. The creation of an international commission for the control of all “dependent” areas not immediately ready for self-government with a view to the ending of exploitation and monopoly, the safeguarding of the welfare of the native peoples and the ensuring of raw materials and opportunities for trade on equal terms to every nation;

3. The establishment of a new political order in Europe based upon the federal principle, involving mutual disarmament and far-reaching surrenders of national sovereignty, and assuring free institutions and essential democratic rights to all peoples?

So much for foreign affairs! What changes did the National Peace Council advocate in order to put our own house in order?

“If the home front,” its manifesto continues, “is vital to the war, it is certainly no less vital to the peace. Moreover, nothing is more likely to commend the conception of democratic freedom which we profess to serve and which we offer to the peoples of Europe and the wider world than the demonstration of that freedom as a reality not merely in Great Britain and the British Dominions, but also in the ‘dependent’ areas which Britain and the Dominions control. In the Council’s view, therefore, proposals for an international settlement should be accompanied by the initiation of a bold programme of political and social change in British territories.

Such a programme should include:

- (a) the granting of full self-government to India;
- (b) the acceleration of progress towards self-government in British and Dominion colonial and mandated areas, and

in the meantime the safeguarding to native peoples of their full freedom of expression and association.

(c) the announcement of plans for economic and social reconstruction in Great Britain and the British Dominions based on the principle that no private or sectional interests shall have power to prejudice the supremacy of the public welfare.

The Committee believes it to be of the greatest importance that the drawing up of proposals for a new international order and for social reconstruction at home should be undertaken now and should not be allowed to wait upon the end of the war, or the achievement of military victory."

A meeting organized in support of these proposals by the National Peace Council in the Central Hall, Westminster, attended by over 3,000 people with an overflow of some six or seven hundred listened with enthusiasm to speeches by H. G. Wells and Señor Madariaga putting forward even more radical plans for world reconstruction. At some of the ideas contained in these plans I shall glance in the last chapter. Other organizations were engaged in similar campaigns.

But impressive as they were, these demonstrations in favour of a constructive and not a punitive peace, this realization of the importance of avoiding the mistakes of Versailles emanated from nobody more authoritative than that devoted band of progressive thinkers who throughout the last twenty years have tried, as persistently as they have tried unsuccessfully, to leaven the vast lump of English indifference, while letters to the Prime Minister and the Press demanding the publication of constructive peace terms were still signed by that same list of familiar signatories to whom Mr. Nevinson has wistfully referred as "the stage army of the good".

A WAR OF IDEAS, NOT OF NATIONS

It was not until after France had collapsed that the conviction that this was a war of ideas and not merely of nationalities spread beyond the circles of the politically

educated Leit and gradually won its way to public acceptance. We had grown so used to thinking of war as an affair between nations, in the waging of which each citizen was required to develop an automatic hatred of anybody who happened to have been born in a bedroom situated on a different line of longitude from his own, that the notion of fighting a man not because of the place of his birth, but because of the doctrines in his head took a considerable time to penetrate the popular consciousness. Yet the plain truth of the matter, which is that this is a war not between Germans as such and Englishmen as such, but between the war machine which has been built up by the Nazis and the peoples of Europe, has at last become so obvious that it no longer requires the witness of the hundreds and thousands of Germans who have been engaged for the last seven years in a continuous struggle against Nazidom to convince us that all that is best in the German mind and bravest in the German heart, so far from being our enemy, is naturally and inevitably our ally. This, I repeat, is a war of ideas not of nationalities. If I had any doubts on the point, the spectacle of those Germans whom I most admire running the most appalling personal risks because of their conviction that the welfare of their country demands the destruction of their present Government, would remove them. But I have none. It is because I know that this is not a struggle which requires me to hate every man born in Germany because he was born in Germany, but only to hate certain ideas which aim at the imprisonment of the minds of civilized men and the destruction of the way of life which has made them civilized, that I have abandoned a pacifism which has served me as a political standby for the last twenty-five years and thrown in my lot with those who insist that the Nazis must be defeated.

And there are thousands like me. We know that the victory of the Nazis means the destruction of the liberal tradition; that our basic conception of the State as a means to the realization of the purposes which individuals have in common will be denied and the status of the individual as

a mere cog in the political machine or more precisely, a cell in the body of the State, be affirmed; that the ends which we hold to be valuable, kindness, compassion and mercy, desire for truth, sensitiveness to beauty, faith in equality, respect for personality, belief in freedom of thought and speech and hatred of cruelty, above all the liberty to live one's life in one's own way without interference by officials—that all these will be destroyed so utterly by a Nazi victory that Europe will enter upon a new Dark Age comparable to that which succeeded the break-up of the Roman Empire. And knowing all this, we cannot escape the conclusion that despite our hatred of war, despite our realization that the goods for the sake of which wars are fought are endangered in the process of fighting for them, this war must nevertheless be fought until it is won; for while war endangers the liberal tradition, a Nazi victory would destroy it past rebuilding.

It is the knowledge that this tradition is still alive in this country, that those who follow it are not fighting for increase of Empire, for the continuance of our rule of India, for the multiplication of markets, for the dismemberment of Germany or the humiliation of Germans, but for the preservation of those political values which are the necessary conditions of civilised existence, which will convey assurance to the refugees and enlist them as our allies in the task of fomenting revolution in Europe.

But if we are to stand before the world as the exponents and guardians of the liberal tradition and, therefore, as the rallying ground of the forces of anti-Nazi revolution, we must give expression to its spirit in our treatment of the problems arising out of the war. This means that there are certain matters in which we must put our own house in order; there is, for example, the matter of our own liberties; there is also the matter of our treatment of refugees.

CIVIL LIBERTY AT HOME

The encroachments upon liberty in England and the treatment of refugees do not fall within the scope of this

book: they have, indeed, been faithfully dealt with in other books in this Series. Some restriction of the liberty of the individual is no doubt necessary in war, but it is permissible to wonder whether the powers with which Sir John Anderson has equipped himself do not constitute as grave a menace to the liberty of the subject as the Nazi Totalitarianism which is used as a pretext for their imposition. I do not for a moment wish to suggest that the restriction upon liberty in this country even in wartime is comparable with the deprivation of liberty which Germans must undergo in peacetime.

I mean merely that the powers exist and could be used—though admittedly they are not at present used—in such a way as to make the British citizen as completely subservient to the Executive as are the peoples of Germany, Italy and—I suppose we must now add—France.

Ministerial decrees passed in a moment of panic suspend Habeas Corpus and Magna Carta, the time-honoured safeguards of the liberties and rights of the individual.

Special courts are envisaged which will have the powers of life and death; long terms of imprisonment, even the death penalty itself, can be inflicted by these courts without intervention of a jury. The right of Parliament to express the sentiments and ventilate the grievances of the people, to remedy defects in administration and check the excesses of officials is imperilled by the growing recourse to secret debate. Official encouragement of a system of spying by irresponsible persons upon the most casual of private conversations recalls one of the worst features of the Nazi regime in Germany.

Quakers can be arrested for expressing in the Meeting House the opinions which constitute the very basis of their faith. Private houses can be visited, their owners cross-questioned for hours at a time, their letters read, their libraries ransacked and books ranging from the products of the Left Book Club to the classics of the liberal tradition removed. (In a recent case, Mill's *Essay on Liberty* was taken away, presumably because the sentiments which it expresses

were out of harmony with the aims for which the war is being waged.)

Again and again Ministers assure us that the free expression of opinion is not fettered, and that there is no intention to fetter it. "I hoped," Mr. Duff Cooper writes to the National Council of Civil Liberties, excusing himself from receiving their deputation, that "the Press announcements which appeared on Monday morning had disposed of the mistaken idea that I had any intention of imposing any limitations on the free expression of opinion in this country," while Sir John Anderson announces in a memorandum to Local Authorities that "no person should be penalised for the mere holding of an opinion, however unpopular that opinion might be to the majority". An admirable sentiment! Yet men and women are being arrested for selling in the street literature expressing unpopular opinions, and conscientious objectors are being deprived of the protection expressly accorded to them by Act of Parliament by wholesale dismissal from the employment of Local Authorities. Even the wives of conscientious objectors have been dismissed from municipal service, presumably on the assumption—an assumption not, one would have thought, justified by an inspection of married couples—that man and wife are not only of one body, but of one mind. The subject is not one which can further be discussed here. Those who wish to pursue it are referred to Ronald Kidd's admirable book, *British Liberty in Danger*. The reader of this book may well feel justified in wondering whether the encroachments and persecutions to which reference has been here briefly made can appropriately be regarded as manifestations of that liberal tradition for which we should be fighting.

TREATMENT OF REFUGEES

Our treatment of refugees is no less open to censure. While men who have been fighting against Hitler all their lives are reduced to exasperated impotence in internment camps, highly placed supporters of Fascism in Spain and

Austria receive commissions in the Army and Air Force. By our internment policy we are depriving ourselves of the services of men whose assistance can be of inestimable value in organising an underground Fifth Column movement on the Continent on the lines indicated in this chapter, prejudicing our reputation as an asylum for the unfortunate and the oppressed, and raising doubts in the minds of our potential allies as to whether we are really the champions of the liberty for which we profess to be fighting. The English have always found it easy to forgive those whom they have wronged, but it may be doubted whether forgiveness will be as easily forthcoming from those whose trust we have betrayed.

CONCLUSION ON PUTTING OUR HOUSE IN ORDER

The bearing of these matters upon the argument of this chapter is sufficiently plain: it is no use contrasting the England of the liberal tradition with the tyranny of the Nazis and then interning or deporting anti-Nazi refugees; no use underlining the moral issues of the war on Monday and closing the Burma Road on Tuesday; no use professing our respect for freedom of opinion and then discharging genuine conscientious objectors from their jobs; no use suppressing the publication of pro-Nazi literature, while we allow Lord Lloyd to write our propaganda for foreign consumption; no use expressing our determination to fight to restore the independence of Czechoslovakia while we are interning members of the independent Czechoslovakian Parliament; no use professing our sympathy with the anti-Fascist revolutionary movement all over Europe while bestowing our approval on Laval in France, Franco in Spain or Konoye in Japan (I suppose we have given up Laval by now, but how Baldwin and Chamberlain did cling to him); no use proclaiming our adherence to the principles of the liberal tradition and respect for the rights of man, while we are planning to hamstring the freedom of the Press, sabotaging free speech and playing tricks with Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus.

SUMMARY

I hope that I have succeeded in making plain the argument of this chapter. The fact that my concern has been with principles must be my excuse for touching lightly upon questions of strategy and not at all upon those of tactics.

I have not, for example, dwelt upon our assets; upon the determination of our people, our growing strength in the air, and the ever-increasing help from America; upon the propagandist value of the bulk purchases by the British Government of stocks of food now accumulating on the quays of South American ports and waiting to be hurried across the seas for the relief of a starving Europe, so soon as its expectant countries throw off the Nazi yoke. I have not dealt with the importance of assisting the revolutionary movement in France as the key to revolution all over the Continent. Of these and many other matters of strategy and tactics others can treat more effectively than I. I am concerned to argue only one point of principle, which I may perhaps be forgiven for summarising as follows: To win this war we must foment a revolutionary movement against the Nazis all over Western Europe; this movement must be supplied with a common cause; it falls to our lot, both because we are still free and because our land is the home of the liberal tradition, to become the rallying ground of that cause, and the cause should be the re-establishment in Europe of a society based upon the principles of liberalism and democracy which I have outlined, with the addition of a further principle to be indicated in the last chapter.

CHAPTER VI

SKETCH OF THE NAZI TRADITION

ON THE NAZI PHILOSOPHY

"To be intelligible," Oscar Wilde remarked, "is to be found out." But our difficulty in dealing with the Nazis is that they do not mind being found out. Again and again with the utmost candour they have explicitly repudiated the principles which we have grown up to take for granted as the necessary conditions of civilised existence, and have proclaimed in their stead the principles of barbarism and tyranny, not shamefacedly, but like naughty children who enjoy cocking snooks at the sanctities of their elders. "What is wrong with Europe," I remember hearing a Nazi journalist remark at Geneva, "is the French Revolution, which has poisoned a century and a half with its principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. From them spring everything that is evil in Europe to-day—Bolshevism, Freemasonry, Trade Unionism, Democracy, even Jews" (a new origin this for the Jews, but any stick is good enough to beat a Jew with).

It is a melancholy but instructive exercise to take one by one the leading principles of the liberal tradition and to savour the scorn which Nazis and Fascists—for often the Italians are even more outspoken than the Germans—pour upon them and the relish with which they proclaim the opposite principles. Desiring to communicate the instruction which I have disciplined myself to receive, I propose to regale my readers with some samples of Nazi philosophy, which I have selected with special reference to the principles I set out in Chapter IV. The samples admittedly are few, and are far from doing justice to the subject, yet I ought, I feel, in, common fairness to set a few Nazi quotations

against the excerpts from the exponents of the liberal tradition which I gave in Chapter II. It is important, after all, to understand one's opponents, and I don't think a little Nazi doctrine will do us any harm. What I have said suggests that instruction re Nazi philosophy is a melancholy exercise. I am not sure that I don't sometimes enjoy it. And when I do, I find it difficult to deny myself the pleasure of quoting from the Nazis in order that others share my pleasure.

GOODS OF THE LIBERAL TRADITION

1. *Respect for the Individual.* The liberal tradition insists that the individual is an end in himself. Nazi doctrine denies this. For it, the individual is only a drop in an ocean of racial purity, a cell in the body politic, having, therefore, no rights save such as the corporate body bestows and no purposes save such as minister to its welfare. "The individual," as Hitler has tersely put it—the quotation is so convenient that I cannot resist repeating it—"has no rights apart from his function as part of the State." What does this imply? That the State has a being of its own; that it is possessed of a will which is different from and more important than the wills of all its members taken separately and that it has purposes and ends to which theirs must be subordinated. Its relation to its members is, in fact, precisely that of a living organism to its parts.

THE HUMAN BODY AND THE BODY POLITIC

The living organism is more than the sum total of the limbs and organs, the nerves, blood, bones and brain which, taken together, compose it. Precisely because it is more, we should realize the absurdity of saying that the lungs have rights of their own as against the body as a whole; or that the stomach or the heart has any purpose or end, save such as contributes to the wellbeing of the whole. But there is more in the analogy between the human body and the body politic than this. The living organism not only transcends but informs all its members; that is to say, the personality of the whole pervades and determines whatever

any part of it does. Thus, what I do is different from what you do precisely because and in so far as my actions express my personality and your actions express yours; and what is true of my actions is also true of my demeanour, of the tone of my voice, the glance of my eyes, and so on. Thus instead of thinking of the various organs and parts of the body as coming together to make the living organism, we must conceive of the organism as a whole as something which precedes and pervades the parts; instead of regarding my separate actions as making up my personality or character, we must think rather of my personality as expressing itself in my actions. Now let us transfer the analogy to the State. The State, it is argued, is not just the sum total of its citizens; it is a whole in the sense in which the living organism is a whole. As such, it is possessed of a personality which transcends and informs the personalities of its citizens; it pervades their natures and expresses itself in their actions. They are not separate and discrete individuals with ends and purposes of their own, any more than the heart is a separate organ with ends and purposes independent of those of the body. The individual, then, belongs to the State, is part of it, and is pervaded by it; he has no ends which are not its ends, no rights save such as it bestows, and no *raison d'être* except in its service. To quote Mussolini, Fascism "conceives of the State as an absolute, in comparison with which all individuals or groups are relative, only to be conceived of in their relation to the State".

THE STATE AND INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS

In pursuance of this doctrine the Fascist State frowns upon every manifestation of individual activity that is not expressive of its being or directed to the promotion of its welfare.

Trade Unions, as we understand them, are independent bodies existing to further the interests of the workers: Trade Unions are therefore suppressed. For the State, as Mussolini tells us, "has drawn into itself even the economic activities of the nation, and, through the corporative social

and educational institutions created by it, its influence reaches every aspect of the national life and includes, framed in their respective organisations, all the political, economic and spiritual forces of the nation". "Why do we require a Labour Party?" asked a Nazi Leader in the early days of the Revolution; "we ourselves are the Labour Party. Why do we require National Parties? we ourselves are a National Party. Why the need for Marxist or Christian Trade Union leaders?"

The Jews are an independent race owing allegiance to an entity vaguely conceived as International Jewry: therefore, the Jews are persecuted and exiled as alien matter, a kind of cancer in the body politic. "The phrase that after all the Jews are human beings will never have the least effect upon us," announced Gauleiter Globoczek soon after the Nazi entry into Vienna.

The Roman Catholic Church is an independent organization owing allegiance in the world to the Pope and through the Pope to God. The Protestant Church recognizes the voice of conscience as the voice of God and, as we have seen, claims the right to say "no" to the State: both are accordingly persecuted, and priests and pastors are interned in concentration camps.

Scholarship and learning exist to serve truth; exist, therefore, to serve something other than the State. Scholarship and learning pursued for their own sake are, therefore, frowned upon. "National Socialism," a decree issued by the Prussian Government in March, 1934, announces "consciously turns away from education that has knowledge as its sole end." "The scientist in a Fascist state," says Mr. Ashton in his book *The Fascist and his State of Mind*, "is only free to search for truth as the State sees it."

Art also claims to be free. The artist follows his inspiration: the spirit bloweth where it listeth. Herr Goebbels does not approve. "So long," he says, "as there remains in Germany any neutral or non-political art, our task is not ended."

These diverse expressions of the Fascist attitude to the independent activities of the mind and spirit, to Trade

Unions, religion and art, illustrate their denial of the principle that the individual is an end in himself. Free thought, free criticism, free research, free worship, free imagination—all these activities are, in the eyes of civilized men, their own justification; all, that is to say, presuppose that the individual is an end in himself. All, therefore, are suppressed by a State which claims that every activity of the citizen should subserve *its* ends and promote *its* welfare. Human nature, in fact, is treated by the Fascist State as a mechanic treats his machine or a gardener his box hedge: the machine may only function when the mechanic wills and for such purposes as the mechanic chooses; the box hedge is only allowed to grow into such shapes as the gardener decides. For neither machine nor box hedge is an end in itself: it is only a feature in a general scheme which transcends it.

2. *Liberty*. Ever since Mussolini publicly trampled on "the putrefying corpse of liberty", Fascist views on the subject of liberty have been so notorious that there is little need to illustrate by many quotations. I begin with two taken from the two official founts of Fascist doctrine. Here, first, is Mussolini informing us in *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism* that "the individual is deprived of all useless and possibly harmful freedom but retains what is essential: the deciding power in this question cannot be the individual, but the State alone". The State, in other words, is prepared to allow its citizens as much liberty as is good for them. How much is good for them? Not as much as they please, but as much or as little as the dictator pleases. For Hitler has told us in *Mein Kampf* that "the dogma according to which the individual personality has a right to its liberty and its dignity can bring nothing but destruction". There is then performed a familiar piece of political sleight of hand, the conclusion of which assures the individual that, when he is forced to serve the purposes of the State, that is to say of dictators, he is in fact achieving his own real freedom. "Man is only free," Hitler writes, "in and through the whole; the whole can only be a sovereign State which tolerates no discussion and no control."

TRUE FREEDOM LIES IN THE
DICTATOR'S SERVICE

The doctrine admittedly sounds outrageous, yet it has a respectable origin: it is in fact a continuation of that strand of thought, traced in Chapter III, which points out that an individual can only realize his true nature in a society. Outside society, then, he is not able to become completely himself; therefore, outside society he is not free to become completely himself; therefore, it is only in society that he achieves true freedom. Instead of sensibly concluding that the object of society is to establish those conditions in which the individual can most *fully* realise his true freedom, the Nazis, encouraged by Fichte, Hegel, Bernhardt and a long line of authoritarian philosophers who were so in love with their own ratiocination that they failed to realise the absurdity of the conclusions in which their thinking landed them, have declared that the sole function of the individual is, quite simply, to serve his society, on the ground that the more complete the service he renders to society, the more complete will be his realisation of his own nature. Thus the possibly true proposition that men only realise themselves in the whole, and the plausible deduction that the whole must therefore be served in order that it may be as proper a whole as possible and so confer the completest self-realisation upon the individual, is transformed into the palpable nonsense that the individual only exists for the sake of the whole. We are now within sight of the principle already examined, that the individual is the means and the State the end. To say that the individual is a means to an end, is to say that he is an instrument which may be manipulated in order to produce the end to which he is a means. In Fascist countries the manipulators are the officials and soldiers, who purport to represent the whole. Hence we shall not be surprised to find every kind of tyranny practised by officials who represent the whole, upon those who are "realising their true freedom" by serving the whole. And this, of course, is precisely what we do find in Nazi

Germany, where men discover that to realize one's freedom in serving the whole means killing and being killed for the whole, and women that to realize one's freedom in serving the whole means producing the men who are to do the killing and suffering the being killed, since "there is no higher or finer privilege for a woman", the Fuehrer has said, "than that of sending her children to war". It is in pursuance of this doctrine of true freedom that Germany has become a land in which whatever is not forbidden is compulsory.

The quality of life that results has been described in many unforgettable pictures of Fascism. The following brief account from Mr. Robert Brady's *The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism* shows to what in practice the doctrine of the realisation of true freedom in the service of the whole amounts. "In plain language," he writes, "this means that the National Peasant Leader tells his designees what they are to do, these tell their inferior officers what to do, these in turn tell the peasant, according to the law, whether or what he may own, may produce or may sell. Since the Nazi philosophy calls for complete 'co-ordination of spirit and ideas', the same 'delegatory' or 'entrusting' or *commanding* applies to social life, leisure time activities, and what the peasant, his family and all rural labour may think, where they may go and how they may feel about everything which affects Germany, which is everything. Nazi writers refer to it as the 'new German freedom'."

3. *Impartial Justice.* The liberal tradition believes that laws should be made by the people through their elected representatives and administered by independent magistrates; it insists, further, that justice must be impartial and that its deliverances must not be biassed by political influences. Where the liberal tradition has flourished these requirements have been to a considerable and, up to the outbreak of the War in 1914, to an increasing extent fulfilled. In Fascist countries not only are they not fulfilled: no attempt is made to fulfil them. Where objective truth is regarded as unimportant—"I expect from the teachers that they give to their pupils the fundamental principles of the philosophy and the idea of National Socialism", said Herr

Rust, Minister of Education. "Not to remain neutral and objective in the school, not to make the child into a cold observer but to waken in him enthusiasm and passion. It is a question of essential and divine values, and not one of cold reality"—where the principle of impartial justice is travestied by the assertion that "justice and Hitler's will are one and the same thing" (Herr Goering), or denied by the identification of justice and State interest "whatever is useful to the German people is right; whatever is harmful is wrong"; said a certain Herr Wagner, ex-Bavarian Minister of the Interior, it is not to be supposed either that justice will be impartial or that its administrators will be unbiassed.

QUALITY OF LIFE IN NAZI GERMANY

This Chapter is concerned with doctrines rather than with events, and I do not wish to deal with matters of common knowledge. It is common knowledge that in Germany the individual has no defence against the arbitrary actions of authority; that the citizen is gagged and muzzled; that he cannot read what he likes—thousands of books have been publicly burnt, thousands more have been banned—listen to what he likes—the crime of listening to a foreign broadcast is one of the most heinous in the criminal calendar of the Third Reich—or speak what he likes, since he knows that his most casual conversation may be eavesdropped and reported to the Secret Police by his friends, his servants and even his children; that for a chance word uttered in what used to be the privacy of his own house he may be arrested and hauled before a biassed or Party court, there to be put on his trial for an offence prescribed by no law or for no offence at all; that if he is an intellectual, a pacifist, a Socialist, a democrat or a Jew—if, in short, he is anybody whose opinions do not march wholly in step with those of the Nazis or who holds a post that a Nazi covets—he may be dragged from his bed without warning and thrust into a concentration camp, there to be toiled and tortured to death; that he must at every moment of his waking life suppress the normal workings of the human intellect and the natural

promptings of the human heart; that he must live in perpetual insecurity, be afraid of every step in the street, tremble at every knock at the door; that his children are taught in the school to report what he says in the home, that his servants may be suborned to spy upon him; that every husband whose wife wishes to pay off a domestic grudge may be denounced to the authorities for something he has never done or for something he may be proud to have done, for speaking kindly to a Pole or for giving shelter to a Jew—that this and much more than this forms part of the daily experience of every citizen of the German Reich, so much, I say, is common knowledge among us all.

Once the germ of delation has taken lodgment in the body politic, it spreads its poison in ever-widening circles of infection until it has corrupted the whole system. Tacitus has transmitted to us an unforgettable picture of the lives men lived under the shadow of the informers in the Rome of the Emperor Tiberius. Those who wish to acquaint themselves with the workings of a similar system in Nazi Germany cannot do better than read Nora Waln's book *Reaching for the Stars*. Here is a kindly, competent Quaker woman who goes to Germany anxious to see what good there is to be seen, determined to make the best of what she finds. Yet the indictment which she has drawn up is damning. As one reads, one cannot fail to realise the haunting fear which pervades the members of a community which has turned its back upon the principles of the liberal tradition and, more particularly, upon that principle which insists upon the independent administration of justice.

Why, it may be asked, is it so important that individuals should be protected by a law impartially administered against the arbitrary fiat of authority? The answer to this question, which is developed under 5 below, is quite simply that human beings cannot be trusted not to abuse their authority, and that, because they cannot, it is necessary that authority should be subject to the check of those over whom it is exercised; so that, if it is exercised unwisely, they will be able to withdraw it.

4. Equality. The liberal tradition believes in equality, not in the sense of maintaining the manifestly untrue proposition that human beings have equal talents and capacities, but in the sense of maintaining that all have an equal right to make the most of such talents as they possess, and that all are equally entitled to respect from the community and to equality before the law. The Nazi doctrine denies this. It denies it both upon racial and upon political grounds. Some races, for example the Germans, are, it maintains, more important than others and, among Germans, some, the members of the Nazi Party, for example, are more important than others.

FICHTE ON THE "NOBLE" AND THE "IGNOBLE"

If you delve into the origins of Nazism you will come ultimately upon the philosophy of Fichte. Fichte, writing at the beginning of the nineteenth century, introduces an instructive distinction between what he calls the noble and what he calls the ignoble man. There are several grades of nobility and ignobility: in the last resort only Fichte himself is, presumably, to be accounted noble, since "the universe", says Fichte, "is myself". Short of Fichte and the universe, however, there is a distinction within the German nation between the noble-minded man, who is prepared to identify himself with and sacrifice himself for the nation, and the ignoble man, who exists only to serve the noble man. Thus, while everybody is to be trained for military service, the noble man fights because "he perpetually sacrifices himself for the devouring flame of higher patriotism which embraces the nation as a vesture of the Eternal, while the ignoble man, who only exists for the sake of the other, must likewise sacrifice himself". While the noble are to be educated to fight and to rule, the object of education in the case of the ignoble, "must consist essentially in this, that it completely destroys the freedom of the will". So much for the Germans. Descending the ladder of the hierarchy of nobility, we next come to a distinction between the most ignoble of Germans and the

most noble of other nations, since "to have character and to be German indubitably mean the same".

NIETZSCHE ON MASTERS AND SLAVES

The conviction of a fundamental inequality between human beings, in virtue of which the noble are entitled to privileges and rights denied to the ignoble, is developed by Nietzsche who, broadly speaking, identifies nobility with the successful use of force. "One must learn," he writes, "to love oneself with a wholesome and healthy love. Oh, my brethren, a new nobility is needed which shall be the adversary of all populace rule and shall inscribe anew the word 'noble' on new tables. And what is noble? To be able to command!" Nietzsche then goes on to develop his conception of two moralities, the morality of the master or ruling class and the morality of the slave class, who are dependent upon the masters. For the masters the antithesis between good and bad means practically the same as the antithesis between "noble" and "despicable"; for the slaves it is the same as the antithesis between "useful" and "dangerous". The *raison d'être* of the slaves consists in being useful to the masters, while the masters do not hesitate to use the slaves they despise. "*We*" (the masters), "bear no grudge against them, these good lambs," Nietzsche generously concedes, "we even like them; nothing is tastier than a tender lamb." War for Nietzsche is the supreme enhancer of the superiority of the superior man and the superior nation. "For nations that are growing weak and contemptible," Nietzsche wrote, "war may be prescribed as a remedy, if, indeed, they really want to go on living. National consumption, as well as individual, admits of a brutal cure. The eternal will to live and inability to die is ever in itself already a sign of senility of emotion."

THE NAZI HIERARCHY

Fichte and Nietzsche have strongly influenced modern Nazi doctrine. The insistence upon will; the glorification of power; the division of mankind into two classes, those who

have the will to seize power and to wield it, the natural leaders of mankind, and those who, lacking will, are the naturally led, the repudiation of the virtues lauded by Christianity—all this and much more in the same vein finds expression in the utterances and the actions of the rulers of contemporary Germany. Within the Nazi State there is a regular hierarchy of inequalities: there is the inequality within the Nazi Party between the S.S. and the S.A.; the inequality between the S.A. and the other members of the Party; the inequality between those who are inside the Party and other Germans. There is the inequality between all Germans and subject peoples like the Dutch,¹ the Danes, the Norwegians and the French, who are at present permitted, within limits, to retain their own laws and whose institutions and Civil Services the Nazis have been willing to take over and run in the interests of the Nazi Government; there is the inequality between the Dutch, the Danes, the Norwegians, and the French and such peoples as the Czechs and the Poles, whom the Nazis propose to turn into purely agricultural peoples, hewers of wood and drawers of water for the master race; and there is the inequality between European and colonial peoples (with whom we must class the Jews) who are regarded as definitely sub-human and not entitled, therefore, to any of the privileges and rights of men.

In the last resort the criterion of superiority and inferiority by reference to which these gradings are effected is always the same—skill and ruthlessness in the use of force. The ruling class in a Fascist community is in practice the class which has seized power: its continuance of rule depends upon its ability to retain power.

I have hitherto spoken only of Germany, but the principle of inequality is common to all forms of Fascism. The essence of the liberal doctrine of equality is to be found in the utilitarian principle that, when considering the purpose and effects of legislation, everybody is entitled to count as one

¹ "For we are not equal to others—we are Germans." Herr Stapel (*Nazi Publicist*).

and nobody as more than one. This is the principle that every form of Fascism denies. "Fascism," writes Mussolini, "denies in democracy the absurd, conventional truth of political equality dressed out in the garb of collective irresponsibility."

5. *Representative government.* The liberal tradition advocates the election of representatives to carry out the wishes of those who elect them. This is not because it is so naïve as to suppose that the representatives will be more intelligent, more honest or more able than the average, or that they will necessarily and always express the wishes or pursue the interests of those who send them to Parliament, but simply because the election of representatives is the least dangerous method of getting a Government which has yet been devised. The essence of the representative system is that you can get rid of your representatives, if they cease to do the job for which you elected them; in other words, you have a check, the check of "the sack", upon what they do.

MEN'S ABUSE OF POWER

Now this, as history has shown, is a necessary safeguard against the abuse of power by individuals. It has been discovered that human beings are not sufficiently angelic to be trusted with arbitrary and irresponsible power, with power, that is to say, which is not subject to law and of which they cannot be deprived, if they abuse it. It is because men's abuse of power has been notorious and flagrant, so notorious and so flagrant that, if history is to be trusted, there is no more subtle corrupter of human character than the possession of irresponsible power, that the democrat insists that no superior individual, no party of superior individuals, however strong their wills, steadfast their convictions, devoted their efforts and determined their good intentions, can be safely entrusted with power which is not subject to check, revision and withdrawal. The careers of the tyrants in Ancient Greece, of Nero and Caligula in Ancient Rome, of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great in Russia, and of the dictators of the South American Republics,

to take but a few instances where history records a hundred, bear witness to the fact that men whose position raises them above human station fall in character below it. To give men the power of gods, is, in fact, to afford a reasonable presumption that they will behave like beasts.

But it is not necessary to be a king in order to bear witness to the disastrous effects of the possession of power upon human character. Every slave-owner who has beaten and starved his slaves, every mill-owner who has overworked and under-paid his employees, every charity school or workhouse master who has bullied and starved the wretches whom indigence has placed in his power, illustrates the same truth. Squeers and Bumble, Mr. Murdstone and Mr. Brocklehurst, have their counterpart by the thousand, and the sum of human misery which has resulted from their exercise of power is past telling. "Power always corrupts, and absolute power absolutely corrupts. All great men are bad," wrote Lord Acton.

Nor is it necessary for the holder of power to be evilly disposed: he need not be, even unconsciously, a sadist to make those who are subject to him miserable. On the contrary, he may be filled with the best intentions. He may be a moral reformer anxious to make men good in this world, or a religious enthusiast intent on saving their souls in the next. He may believe in what is essentially harmless—in temperance, for example, or vegetarianism, or the virtue of wholemeal bread. Yet his possession of unchecked power will transform his individually harmless belief into a public menace. He will misjudge men's desires, misunderstand their purposes, flout their wishes. He will make what he believes to be the best possible laws and hold up his hands in horror at men's ingratitude in repudiating them. In a word, with the best intentions in the world he will make men miserable, simply because he cannot put himself in their place.

It is for these reasons that representative government has been adopted by democracies, not because it is the best, not even because it is good, but simply lest worse

should befall. For politics, as Plato has reminded us, is the art of the second best.

MAJORITY RULE

Representative government implies majority rule. Once again, the liberal tradition has upheld majority rule not because it believes that the majority is always wise or always right, nor because it deludes itself that there is some fount of unerring wisdom in the common people, nor because it supposes that experts might not, on some particular issue, possess more wisdom than is available to the uninstructed man or prescribe a better course of action than he would be able to devise, but for the simple reason that what should be done in a community is what most people want done. Now of what most people want done the best judges are the people themselves. Similarly with regard to the making of laws. It is not doubted that if you entrust the business of legislating to non-representative experts, you may get better laws than those which represent the desires of the uninstructed majority. But to govern a State efficiently, to frame good laws, is not enough: the efficiency must be such as is compatible with people's happiness; the laws such as they wish to obey. It is better for imperfect men to live under imperfect laws that fit them, that reflect their desires and suit their needs, than that they should be disciplined to the requirements of legislative perfection. Twentieth century human nature is a loose, untidy, ample sort of growth full of unacknowledged needs and unsuspected oddities; and just as a foot which is ill-shaped cannot without unhappiness to its owner be thrust into a perfectly formed shoe, so a community of imperfect human beings cannot without unhappiness be thrust into the strait-jacket of perfectly conceived laws. We must, then, cut our legislative coat according to the cloth of human nature, which means that we must have the right to cut it for ourselves. In a word, it is only the wearer who knows where the shoe pinches, and the wearer should therefore be entitled to choose his own shoe.

Now all these principles—the principle of representative government, the principle that the majority should decide policy, and the principle that the majority should make the laws, are denied by Fascism. Fascism denies that the wishes of the majority should prevail. Refusing to admit that, while human beings may differ in respect of their capacities and usefulness to society, they are, nevertheless, all equally important to themselves, Fascism insists not that the people as a whole, but that “noble”¹ or “superior” persons should rule. It denies what Mussolini calls “the absurd untruth” that “the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of a periodical consultation, and it affirms the immutable, beneficial and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently levelled through the mere operation of a mechanical process such as universal suffrage”. Fascism denies, therefore, the principle that the functions of government should be exercised by the representatives whom the majority elect to carry out their wishes. For it, rulers are instituted and Governments established not by the principle of election from below but by that of appointment from above.

THE LEADER AND THE HIERARCHY

At the apex of the whole structure is the Leader, owing perhaps an intermittent and spasmodic allegiance to some tribal god, who is normally kept in the Leader's pocket but, when occasion demands, is trotted out and exhibited to the public making gestures of approval of the Leader and announcing the complete identification of their wills. Apart from this official relation to a dubious deity, the Leader is responsible to nobody. The principle by which the Leader is himself appointed is part of the *mystique* of Fascism. He is not elected; he appears. Having appeared, like the Tibetan Grand Lama, he is immediately recognized by his marks, but whereas the marks of the Lama are

¹ For this somewhat technical sense in which the word “noble” is used, see above pp. 78-9.

physical, those of the Leader are spiritual and mental. Having emerged, he proceeds mysteriously to embody the General Will of the community by a fiction which would have horrified Rousseau, until he is translated to Valhalla. Meanwhile, he selects for office and power the best among his followers, choosing them on the basis of past loyalties and binding them to him by future promises. The principle of leadership thus established operates from the top downwards. Those chosen by the Leader to be his followers choose in their turn from the best among their followers those who are to serve and to be led by them. Thus a hierarchy is established which extends through every phase of Fascist society, through government, industry, education and the armed forces. Under this system, authority, whose source is at the top of the ladder, is successively devolved by those occupying each rung to those on the rungs immediately below them. At the bottom are to be found those who, in Fichte's words, "only exist for the sake of the others" in whom the "freedom of the will has been completely destroyed".

There is, therefore, in a Fascist State no safeguard against bad government and no guarantee against oppression, because there is no method save that of force by which subjects can rid themselves of those who misgovern and oppress them. So long as the rulers are able by threat of their superior organization of force to maintain themselves in the positions to which they have appointed one another, so long does the hierarchy stand. Since it rules by force, the only way in which a Fascist Government can be deposed is by superior force; hence in a Fascist State there can be no opposition. The advantage of an opposition is that it provides for the possibility of change of government without revolution; when the Government becomes unpopular, there, given an opposition, is an alternative Government waiting to take its place. But the recourse of changing the Government is not open to the citizens of a Fascist State, who must accept the self-appointed hierarchy of rulers who have been foisted upon them in precisely the same way as the citizens of Plato's state accepted the philosopher-

guardians, in whose appointment they had no say, without having the consolation of knowing, as Plato's citizens knew, that their guardians were perfect.

6. *Education.* Believing in equality of opportunity, the liberal tradition holds that every man has a right to be educated so that he may develop his capacities and make the most of his talents. It holds, further, that no child, however humble its origins, should be denied this right; and finally, that nobody is entitled by reason of birth or inherited wealth to claim a better education than his neighbour. There should, in a word, be no privilege in education. The Nazis deny this, and their denial derives directly from the denial of equality.

WHY THE NAZIS OBJECT TO EDUCATION

The Nazis have two objections to education. First, good education makes bad slaves, and the Nazis' philosophy, as we have seen, provides for a slave class and slave nations. "Education," Rauschning reports Hitler as saying, "endangers the maintenance of a slave class". Hitler, accordingly, announces his determination to "put an end to what is known as universal education. Universal education is the most corroding and disintegrating poison that liberalism has ever invented for its own destruction".¹ Secondly, education engenders alert and critical minds; it enables people to think for themselves and it produces, therefore, good critics. Now for those who regard the individual not as an end in himself but as a cell in an organism greater than himself, independent thinking in individuals is a nuisance: theirs not to reason why, theirs unthinkingly to further the purposes of the State. Only the guardians, as Plato would say, are to think; the rest are to follow their leaders like a flock of sheep. Thus it is not surprising that rulers whose position is dependent upon the slavishness of the ruled should desire to deprive them of opportunities for education, or should educate them only with one end in view. This end may be described as the

Quoted from Dr. Rauschning's book, *Hitler Speaks*.

provision of information without intelligence. To give information without intelligence is to open a man's mind to what you propose to put into it without giving him the power to put anything into it himself. It is to give the power to read without the ability to criticise what is read. Beings so educated are from the political point of view, not men but sheep, ready to flock into the appropriate pen at the voice of the shepherd proclaiming the latest enemy, the most sensational scare or the most up-to-date stunt. This, of course, is precisely what Dr. Goebbels wants. Like Nietzsche he bears no grudge against "these good lambs. We even like them; nothing is tastier than a tender lamb". Desiring lambs, it is not surprising to find the Nazis denouncing knowledge and truth and looking askance at the type of mind which pursues the one and desires the other. "National Socialism," says a decree defining the Nazi conception of education, "consciously turns away from education that has knowledge as its sole end." "The true object of education," adds Dr. Frick, Nazi Minister of the Interior, "is to produce the man, political, who in all thoughts and actions is rooted in his nation and inseparably attached to its history and faith. Objective truth is secondary, and not always to be desired."

When the conception of truth is admitted at all, it is treated pragmatically. There is no such thing as absolute truth, there is only what is true for us; and what is true for us is what will enable us to change the world in ways which we desire, or, more briefly, what serves our interest. It was Hitler himself who denounced "the bloody objectivity" of Herr von Papen and his fellow judges because they condemned the murder of Communists by Nazis at Beuthen.

In a word the Nazis hate truth except when it happens to suit them, and distrust intelligence in everybody except themselves. Their conception of an educated public opinion is not of an opinion which is critical and informed but of one which is drugged with lies—has not the Leader himself said that the bigger the lie, the more likely it is to be believed? for whereas a critical—and informed public

opinion is a prerequisite of democracy, gullibility is a necessity of dictatorship. A just and competent Government has nothing to fear from an educated public; an unjust and incompetent one has every incentive to keep its citizens uneducated and, because uneducated, uncritical. It is, after all, easier to govern sheep than men.

7. *Christianity.* The liberal tradition is, as I have tried to show, in part an offshoot of Christianity; its principles are all consonant with the precepts of Christ and the first derives directly from His teaching. Fascism denies Christianity. Consider for example, the following extraction from the Catechism of the German Evangelical Church. "The German has his own religion which springs living from his own special observation, sentiment and thought. We call it the German or German-racial religion, and by that we mean the peculiar and natural German faith in the nation . . . The German of today needs a healthy and natural religion which makes him brave, pious and strong, in the fight for folk and Fatherland. The German religion is such a creed; it is a religion without symptoms of disease and degeneration. Christianity is not such a creed. On the contrary it is rather the type of an unhealthy and unnatural final religion." In effect, the religion of Christianity is rejected and for it is substituted the religion of "the peculiar and natural German faith in the nation". Supporting evidence could be taken from any one of a number of similar announcements. I select one from August Hoppe, a youth leader, to show the extent of the hostility. "We must summon all our forces for a final battle against Christianity. You must fight in the true spirit of anti-Christ against the last remnant of the heritage of Christianity in the Nordic race." Further light is thrown upon the German religion of "faith in the nation" by the following article of faith which is taught to and repeated by school children in Germany.

"I believe in Germany, God's other beloved son . . . who suffered from Papists . . . who has been crushed to hell by all kinds of devils . . . seated with the great

brother of Nazareth at the right hand of the Almighty whence He shall come as a Saviour to judge the dead . . .”

“God’s other beloved son,” Germany, in the person of his visible fleshly embodiment, the Fuehrer, passes through a series of interesting metamorphoses. He first assumes a position of superiority *vis-à-vis* his brother Christ. “Hitler is a new, a greater and a more powerful Christ,” announced Herr Spaniel, the Nazi leader in the Saar. Presently we find him being invoked as the Holy Ghost. “Adolf Hitler is the real Holy Ghost,” said Church Minister Kerri in a sermon. More recently, however, he shows signs of assuming a role which is greater than that either of Christ or of the Holy Ghost and evinces an increasing tendency to turn into God.

HITLER AS THE DEITY

He enters upon this final phase by first developing God’s attributes. “Hitler is lonely,” said Dr. Frank, Minister of Justice, “so is God. Hitler is like God.” Next he assumes God’s prerogative of issuing Commandments.—“We greet the Leader each morning and we thank him each night that he has provided us officially with the will to live,” runs the first of a series of Ten Commandments drawn up for the benefit of German workers. Next he assumes powers over good and evil, right and wrong. “What Hitler decides is right and will remain eternally right,” says Herr Wagner, Bavarian Minister of the Interior, while I have already quoted Goering’s declaration of identity between justice and Hitler’s will.¹ Like God he commands service; in fact God’s service is his service. “To serve Hitler is to serve Germany; to serve Germany is to serve God.” Finally, he shares God’s attributes of creativeness. Thus a picture of Hitler in the Munich Art Gallery, speaking at a meeting immediately prior to the Nazi seizure of power, is entitled “In the Beginning was the Word”. But though Hitler is “like God”, it cannot be said that Hitler’s word which was “in the Beginning” is like God’s word which was “in the

¹ See p. 76.

Beginning". Indeed, they speak in very different accents. There is an undoubted disposition, at least in the West, to believe that God's word is embodied in Christianity; yet Christianity, as we have already seen, is condemned as "an unhealthy and unnatural religion". There is, for example, the embarrassing fact that Christ was a Jew—although, as Nazi apologists have hastened to point out, a Jew "only on His Mother's side"—and that his religion is therefore a Jewish religion. Then there is the unfortunate pacifist brush with which Christianity has historically been tarred.

THE GERMAN RELIGION ON THE SUBJECT OF WAR

German writers have always praised war, war being an article of faith of the "German-racial religion". Here, for example, are some pre-Nazis on the subject. "War is an integral part of God's universe developing man's noblest attributes," said Moltke. It follows that "the condemnation of war is immoral" (Treitschke). Being an "integral part of God's universe", it is not surprising to learn from Wilke that "war is a divine institution". I do, however, find some difficulty in accepting Wilke's further statement that war is "a work of love". So much for the pre-Nazis.

When we come to the Nazis, the divine approval of war is rendered at once easier and more plausible by the growing identification between Hitler and God and the consequent difficulty of distinguishing their two wills. Now Hitler has always shown a predilection for war. It is natural, therefore, to suppose that God shows a predilection for war. "Nations living in eternal peace . . ." writes Dr. Ley, Nazi Minister of Labour, "lose manliness. Therefore war is not God's scourge, but on the contrary, God's blessing. War is not heaven's judgment, but on the contrary, the eternal renewal source, producing the new generations." In the light of God's blessing of war what are we to make of the indubitably pacifist leanings of Christianity; what, more particularly, of those embarrassing remarks in the Sermon on the Mount? The obvious thing to do is to rewrite

them, and they are accordingly rewritten by Reichs Bishop Mueller, Nazi Head of the German Evangelical Church, who has carefully eviscerated Christ's statements of anything which might be calculated to shock a good Nazi. I have set out the Authorized and the Muellerized versions side by side.

Authorized Version

Muellerized Version

Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.

Happy is he who always maintains good comradeship for he will be successful in the world.

Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.

Happy is he who bears sorrow with manliness. He will have strength and not despair or lose courage.

Blessed are the peacemakers for they shall be called the children of God.

Happy are they who keep peace with their compatriots; they fulfil God's will.

Most instructive is the Nazi version of that most objectionable passage enjoining the offering of the left cheek after the right has been smitten. It reads as follows:

"Should a comrade slap thee in the face in his excitement, it is not always the right thing to hit back immediately. It is more manly to keep an imperturbable poise. Then the comrade will probably be ashamed of himself."

The restriction of the blessing upon peacemakers to those who keep the peace only with their comrades and compatriots is significant. After this it is no surprise to learn that the official New Year carol sung by every German child between the ages of ten and eighteen to usher in the New Year, runs as follows:

"With the bells in the tower
Let us arise,
And fan the fires
Which to heaven shall rise
And bear our weapons—for the Year is new;
War is the watchword! Make the watchword true."

Mussolini, as might be expected, is in agreement. "For me," he has confessed, "violence is perfectly moral, more moral than compromise. War is to men as motherhood is to women. I do not believe in perpetual peace." Growing lyrical he adds, "Though words are very beautiful things, rifles, machine guns, ships, aeroplanes and cannons are more beautiful things still."

"War is the watchword; make the watchword true"! No, assuredly it is not the Christian spirit that pervades the German religion.

When, as a consequence of repudiating all the doctrines which Christianity teaches, the Germans have conquered the world, then they will generously present it as an offering to God. "And when the Germanic, the Nordic man has set his foot upon the last strip of conquered land," writes Wilhelm Stapf in his book, *The Christian Statesman*, "he will take the crown of the world and lay it at God's feet." Possibly, possibly not, but one may be pardoned for wondering whether the Christian God will be pleased. But perhaps it is not the Christian God whose feet are intended but only those of Hitler under his divine alias.

CHAPTER VII

THE LIBERAL TRADITION BROUGHT UP TO DATE

I HAVE SEVERAL TIMES in the course of the preceding argument referred the reader to certain amplifications which were to be found in the last chapter. There were, I hinted, certain additional principles by which the five outlined in Chapter IV required to be supplemented, if they were to constitute an adequate statement of the liberal tradition in the special circumstances of our time. I did my best to keep any reference to these additional

principles out of the argument. The fact that I did not wholly succeed must be taken as a testimony to their relevance, a relevance which was so insistent that they could not help but intrude themselves into the statement of my thesis.

I am, indeed, convinced that it is only if the liberal tradition is amplified by these additional principles that it can survive. In becoming the necessary conditions of its continuance, they have therefore become an integral part of its contemporary statement. Nevertheless, it seemed to me important to keep them apart from the rest. The five principles already stated are accepted. They are not, at any rate among us to-day, matters of controversy. The principles now to be stated are highly controversial and there are many who do not accept them. Nevertheless, I contend that, since the realization of the first five has to-day become dependent upon the addition of these supplementaries, to assert that what is really at stake in this war is the liberal tradition without mentioning these indispensable conditions of its realization, is disingenuous, if it is not dishonest. On reflection, I find that these additional principles can for my present purpose be conveniently assembled under one. This is the principle of federation.

INTRODUCTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF FEDERATION

Federation has become a vast subject, ramifying into constitutional and political theory, law, economics, philosophy and psychology. I cannot, it is obvious, attempt to follow these manifold ramifications here and must confine myself only to those aspects of the subject which are relevant to my main theme. Federation may be defined¹ as the union of free peoples, under a common Government directly or indirectly elected by and responsible to the peoples for their common affairs, with national self-government for national affairs. The common Government would take over from the national Governments the control of foreign

¹I take the definition from the publications of the Federal Union movement.

and economic policy, including tariffs, currency, questions of emigration, communications and public works. It would also pool and control the armed forces of the countries that come into union and take over the administration of their colonies and dependencies until such time as these are ready to enter the federation as responsible, self-governing units in their own right. The various national Governments would retain control of matters of domestic concern such as education, health, housing, taxation, roads, marriage laws, and the criminal code; broadly speaking, all matters which fall within the spheres of the Ministries of Health, Labour, and Transport, Home Office, Office of Works, and the Inland Revenue. Such is the bald statement of the federalist proposal. I want to consider this proposal from two points of view: first, from that of its potentialities as a war-winning weapon, secondly as a condition of the continuance of the liberal tradition.

I

FEDERATION AS A WAR-WINNING WEAPON

THE POTENTIAL ENEMIES OF THE NAZI REGIME

Let us try for a moment to conceive what may be the present position inside Germany. I have argued that there must be thousands of Germans who loathe the Nazi regime and would be delighted to see it overthrown. But it is not only fear of the Gestapo which makes them silent; they are also apprehensive as to the sequel. What, they ask themselves, will come afterwards? Communism? The sentiments of middle-class property owners in Germany are, I make no doubt, little different from those of middle-class property owners in France and in England. Under Communism these men fear for their property and their savings; many of them fear for their lives. But Communism would at least imply some sort of government, however (in their eyes) detestable. What if the only alternative to Communism and Nazism is the chaos of complete breakdown?

Considerations of this kind induce Germans who otherwise would be apathetic or openly hostile to support the Nazis for fear of worse to come, if the Nazis are overthrown. Since the war, these considerations have received important reinforcement. Apart from the growth of natural unity which hatred of the enemy, especially of a bombing enemy, brings—it is a remarkable fact that the one thing that can unite a people is the one thing they all know to be wrong, namely, war—there is among Germans a very legitimate apprehension in regard to our war aims. Early in the war it was customary to make a distinction between the Nazi Government and the German people and to argue that it was foolish as well as unjust to show your disapproval of a tyranny by making its innocent victims suffer. As the stresses of the war have deepened, this distinction has tended to disappear and in unguarded moments men can be heard to commit themselves to sentiments of the most appalling vindictiveness. When we have won the war, we are to break up the German Reich into its component principalities, destroy German industry, raze German cities to the ground and plough the land with salt, kill every third German woman or sterilize German men as one sterilizes tom cats. Some trickle of this stream of denunciation no doubt finds its way into Germany and makes men willing to fight to the last ounce of their capacity on behalf of a Government which they might otherwise oppose, to avoid the destruction which is so unwisely threatened. To win them, we must make things easy, not difficult, for defeated Germany; so easy that a Fifth Column inside Germany will be willing to assist us in compassing Germany's defeat, knowing that a defeat of the Nazis is a victory for Germany.

I conclude that we must seek to apply to Germany the methods of Fifth Column formation described in Chapter V. The adoption of these methods means the publication of war principles. We are fighting, we should say to Germany, for the establishment of a European order which embodies the principles of the liberal tradition. Moreover, we invite you to join with us in the effort to realize those principles.

AN OFFER TO GERMANY

Now it is at this point that the importance of federation as an additional war principle makes itself apparent. Just before France collapsed, Mr. Churchill made an offer of union to the French Government. It was to involve common citizenship and the establishment of a joint Government to take control of the foreign and economic policies of the two national Governments. I suggest that a similar offer should be made to Germany, its realization being conditional upon the overthrow of the present Nazi Government. "What," we should say in effect to the German people, "do you want out of this war? Lebensraum? Colonies? Access to raw materials? New markets? Participation in the trading advantages enjoyed by the British Empire? You can have them all, and what is more you can have them without fighting, if you will unite with us to form a common Government; but if you are to do this, you must first get rid of your present Government.

"Just think for a moment of the advantages which a common Government would bring. First, we should pool all our arms in a single federal armament, thus freeing ourselves from the constant menace of war with one another which has weighed upon two generations in both our countries. Secondly, you will share with us in all those economic advantages which you have hitherto resentfully regarded as the jealously guarded prerogatives of imperial Britain, in the administration of colonial lands, in the right of equal access to the raw materials, which they contain and the markets which they offer—all these advantages you will enjoy on equal terms with ourselves as partners in an Empire which was once British, but is now federal. Thirdly, there are certain problems, mainly of an economic character, which for years before the war distressed our people and yours, subjecting us to alternate booms and slumps, creating armies of unemployed, and rendering us unable to absorb the goods which the increased productivity of industry resulting from applied science so

embarrassingly showered upon us. Both of us tried to meet the situation by erecting economic barriers against one another and so made it worse. In our federation these barriers would disappear and by increasing the size of the area over which trade can freely operate without the hampering restrictions of tariffs, customs duties, quotas, currency restrictions and favoured nation clauses, we shall greatly increase the economic prosperity of both our countries. What is more, when we are no longer trying to cut one another's economic throats we can co-operate to plan our joint economic system with a view to increasing the prosperity of our citizens.

"Finally, there is the question of the damage which is being done during this war—damage which has chiefly been caused by your armies in the lands which they have overrun and by your air force in the cities they have bombed. After the last war we charged you with this damage and imposed a punitive blockade in order to ensure that you paid the debt. Our efforts in this direction were not, however, very successful, and reparations, though scaled down again and again, were a festering sore that poisoned our relations for years. You felt them to be unjust; we, that you were deliberately cheating us by your inadequate payments. We promise you that there will be nothing of the sort this time. For one thing, we believe that we are all in our degree guilty of this war; for another, we are convinced that a punitive peace will only sow the seeds of further wars; for a third, that economic penalties have a boomerang effect; for a fourth, we strongly suspect that the devastation that this war will have caused by the time it is over, the destruction of industry and agriculture, the famines—we notice, by the way, that you are already having difficulty in feeding the populations that you have brought under your control—and the epidemics which famine is likely to bring in its train, will be too widespread to be successfully dealt with by any one national Government. We suggest, then, that they should be a common charge upon us all, and that the Federal Government

which we are inviting you to join should make itself responsible for taking over the administration of the areas devastated by the war and repairing the damage which it leaves in its train. Indeed, only a Federal Government which can stimulate the fullest development of our common resources and secure the widest expansion of markets can possibly hope to cope effectively with the legacy of poverty and disease which the war will leave in its train.

"All these things we can promise you if you will join with us in establishing a common Federal Government; we only add, in case it may have been forgotten, that you must first get rid of your present Government."

Such a series of proposals offering union as an alternative not only to the Nazi Government but to the Communism or chaos which are feared as a result of its overthrow, cannot be without its effect upon whatever elements in Germany are anxious for change.

AN OFFER TO EUROPE

I would make a similar offer to whatever other nations in Europe were successful in throwing off the Nazi yoke. This means that to the principles enunciated in Chapter IV I would add the principle of federation as the necessary condition for the realization of the Charter for twentieth-century man. The account which I gave in Chapter V of the methods which must be followed in order to turn this war into a revolutionary war of liberal ideas was, it may be remembered, beset by a doubt, the very legitimate doubt whether, in attempting to organize Fifth Column activities against the Nazis in Europe, we should not be met by a disinclination, a very natural disinclination, to get rid of the Nazis in order to confirm the British Empire. Why, potential Fifth Columnists might ask, should we risk our lives for Britain, even for a Britain which now comes to us clad in the white sheet of the liberal tradition? When the devil was sick, the devil a liberal would be; but when the devil is well, the liberal, as has been observed before, is apt to turn into an imperialist. These doubts and dis-

inclinations seem to me to be well justified. It is essential that we should remove them, and the most effective way of removing them is to make it plain that it is not for the British Empire but for a federal Europe that we are asking our proposed Fifth Columnists to fight. In other words, Britain can become the focus of European revolution only if, the revolution successfully accomplished, Britain ceases to be an independent imperial power and becomes a partner in a European federation. On this basis, we are asking anti-Nazi Fifth Columnists to take part in a struggle which is theirs as much as ours, since it is a struggle not only to get rid of the Nazis, but to set up a new Europe in whose government they will participate on equal terms with ourselves.

HITLER THE UNITER

It is one of the paradoxes of history that Hitler, the most ferocious of nationalists, should have done more than any other man to destroy nationalism; that Hitler, who lives by fomenting disunity, should have done more than any other man to promote unity. In effect Hitler has unified Europe, but unified it under Nazi domination. It would be criminal if we were to destroy the unity that Hitler has so unexpectedly created; it would be criminal to go back to the Europe of competing States, each animated by a belligerent nationalism which impels it to pursue its own interests, to the prejudice of the interests of other States. The history of the last twenty years should have taught us, if it has taught us anything, that no lasting peace can be made along these lines. The Treaty of Versailles attempted to solve the minority problem by Balkanizing Europe; almost it might be said that it created a separate State wherever it found a separate minority. But the history of the last twenty years should have taught us, if it has taught us anything, that there is no solution of the minority problem along these lines.

"The only thing that men learn from history is that men learn nothing from history." The remark is Hegel's. I

would suggest that we prove Hegel wrong on this point as on so many others, by learning from the history of the last twenty years not to destroy the unity which Hitler has so providentially created, by allowing Europe to lapse once more into a congeries of jealous, suspicious, belligerent, independent sovereign States. But the refusal to restore disunity does not entail a retention of Hitler's unity. The unity of the Europe beyond Hitler must be a unity of willing partnership between equals, not of enforced domination by a military superior. If this is to be achieved, the claim of the minorities must be met and the minorities themselves transcended by a federal system, in which they will cease to resent the loss of their independent sovereignties when they realize that independent sovereignty in Europe has become a thing of the past.

For these reasons I submit that the principle of federation should be added to the list of principles already given. It is difficult to over-estimate the potentialities of this principle as a war-winning weapon; it is, indeed, the only principle which enables us to plan for a Europe beyond Hitler without destroying the unity which Hitler has imposed.

II

FEDERATION AS THE CONDITION OF THE CONTINUANCE OF THE LIBERAL TRADITION

But there is another and, it seems to me, a more powerful reason for including the principle of federation among the principles for which we are fighting in this war. It is that federation has become the condition of the realization of all the rest. Federation, in short, is the logical development of the liberal tradition, since it has become the pre-requisite of the survival of that tradition.

POLITICAL ASSOCIATION AS A MEANS TO AN END

The liberal tradition regards the fact of political associations not as an end in itself, but as a means to the fulfilment

of the purposes and the preservation of the rights of individuals. "Governments are instituted among men," as the American Constitution has it, to secure the rights "of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." Governments, be it noted, not any particular kind of government. The object of political association, says Thomas Paine, "is the preservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man". The object of any political or of all political associations, that is to say, not of *any one kind of political association*. Not necessarily and only, therefore, of that kind of political association which is a nation State.

Once you concede that the object of political association is to be found in something beyond itself, then, if the something is not achieved, the justification of the political association disappears. Political association is no doubt necessary, but there is nothing sacrosanct about any particular form of it; and if in a particular set of circumstances it is found that one form secures better than another the ends for which political associations were instituted, that is a sufficient reason for substituting the more efficient form for the less efficient. In other words, the form of political association which best serves the purpose for which political associations were instituted, may not remain constant. During the last three hundred years it may be presumed that the national State is the form which has served them best. The question we have now to consider is whether it still serves them best. Does the contemporary State guarantee and preserve our rights, in particular, our rights of security, liberty, possession, health and happiness? To me it is obvious that it does not.

THE ABOLITION OF DISTANCE

Now for this failure on the part of the State to secure the ends for which it was instituted there is a very good reason. The national State has become an anachronism. The reasons for this are well known and I shall not dwell upon them. If we explore them, we find that in almost every case they derive from the discoveries of science and

the application of those discoveries to industry, transport and commerce. During the last hundred and fifty years man has achieved an unprecedented success in altering the position in space of pieces of matter, including that piece of matter which is his own body, with ever-increasing rapidity; as a result, the rate of transit and transport increases and distance diminishes. Our world is one in which it takes a shorter time to travel from London to New York than one hundred and fifty years ago it took to travel from York to London. Nor is this advance in the speed and range of the increase in the facilities for human intercourse likely to stop. We can to-day talk one with another from the ends of the earth; in a dozen years we shall see one another face to face; to-day we can fly in the air; to-morrow we shall fly in the stratosphere, and so on.

The changes in the range and scale and pace of living resulting from the abolition of distance are prodigious. Yet while the circumstances of our lives have changed beyond the imagination of our predecessors, our political structure has remained stationary. While the world has shrunk to the size of a continent, the boundaries of the nation States have remained constant. The horse and foot mode of travel is outmoded, yet we still live in horse and foot communities. The world is economically a single whole, yet politically it is based upon the assumption that it is a congeries of economically self-sufficient national units.

THE STATE AS AN ANACHRONISM

For across the surface of this world run the frontiers of the nation States. Many of these were fixed in the remote past; the most recent date for the most part from the eighteenth century. They represent a mode of living very different from that of to-day. When a man could travel for several days through the territory of a single State, State frontiers made some sort of sense; to-day, when he can fly in twenty-four hours across the boundaries of half a dozen States, they make nonsense. An airman looks down upon a stretch of country which wears for miles the same

appearance. What is it to him whether he is on the Dutch side of the frontier or the Belgian?

In the new situation created by the abolition of distance, it is only by resorting to every kind of artificial device that the State can preserve its integrity, only by restricting and impeding the free flow of commodities and communications that it can succeed in holding up the manifest drive of the world towards unity. This is the meaning of the tariffs and the quotas, the export and the import duties, the currency restrictions and customs and passports and all the other devices by means of which the State seeks to preserve its integrity and barricade itself against its neighbours. How else is it to resist the continuously increasing pressure from its neighbours? Yet none of these devices can indefinitely avail it. For, as the world shrinks, the nation States will be jostled ever more closely together, until the pressure grows so severe that, unless by then they have consented to soften the hard outlines of their separate individualities, they will grind one another to pieces.

The situation may be likened to that of a number of people sleeping in a bed which begins to shrink. As the bed grows narrower the sleepers are jostled together; presently somebody is thrown on top of somebody else; there is a row, and somebody is thrown out. Similarly, as distance diminishes and the world shrinks, the States of the world are brought into ever closer proximity. Between them they build up partitions in the hope of keeping themselves to themselves, but the partitions fail to keep them apart, or do so only at the cost of impoverishment and exasperation. When the emotions generated by the shrinking bed of the modern world have reached the necessary pitch of intensity there is a war, and somebody gets thrown out.

THE LIBERAL TRADITION PERMITS ADAPTATION

The moral is obvious: as conditions change, the unit of political organization must change to reflect them. Indeed, one does not have to be very much of a Marxist to recognize

that sooner or later forms of political organization must change to fit changes in their environment, if only because forms of political organization reflect their environment. Thus a form of political association which is best adapted to fulfilling men's purposes and guaranteeing their rights in one set of circumstances may be far from adequately performing this function in another. The Nazi theory of the State, regarding the State as an ultimate form of organization, concerning it as a living organism possessed of personality in its own right, is precluded from recognizing either the possibility of passing or the need to pass beyond it. And if the State is indeed a living organism possessed of a personality of its own, the Nazis are right, for on this supposition you can no more amalgamate two States than you can amalgamate two personalities, and federation must be regarded as an empty dream. But the liberal tradition, which regards the State as nothing more than a device for doing a particular job—that of fulfilling men's needs and guaranteeing their rights—finds no difficulty in supposing that the State may be transcended. For it, the State has always been provisional, the least unsatisfactory of a variety of devices, the least bad of a number of evils; and it is prevented by nothing in its theory from superseding the State and substituting for it some other form of political organization, so soon as the evils which it brings in its train appear to be greater than those which would be involved by adopting a larger and looser form of political organization.

The liberal tradition, in short, is free to recognize the obvious fact that a growth in the size of the unit of association has characterized the whole of man's past history and to draw the obvious deduction that a larger and looser form of political organization may well be overdue.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

To say that a growth in the unit of association has characterized human history, is only part of the truth. The truth is that such a growth is characteristic of the history of life itself, and begins long before man appeared on

the scene. At a recent lecture to the British Association, Dr. Langdon Brown represented this continuous growth as an integral feature of the evolutionary process. Evolution, he pointed out, proceeds not by increasing the size of the creatures who are progressively evolved—though it may have done so for a time, this phase came to an end with the disappearance from the evolutionary stage of the mesozoic reptiles—but by increasing the size of the unit of organization. The earliest form of life is a single-cell organism of the amoeba type; an advance takes place when a number of single-cell organisms unite to constitute a multi-cellular organism, a mammal being a colony of many million cells. There is a further advance when one multi-cellular organism joins with another to constitute a family; a further advance when family joins with family to constitute a tribe; and presently tribe joins tribe to constitute a province, department, or canton. In course of time provinces, or departments, or cantons are joined to form the nation State. This last step was comparatively recently achieved. Readers of Shaw's play *Saint Joan* will remember the difficulty which Joan experienced in getting her soldiers to realize the conception of France as an entity. Picardy, Artois, Gascony—all these they knew, loved and were willing to fight for. But what was France that they should fight for it? To-day France is the most strongly centralized of all nation States. A similar integration may be observed in our own history. In its beginning we see the men of Dover fighting the men of Folkestone; a little later the men of Kent are fighting against the men of Wessex; a little later still the men of South England are fighting against the men of Northumbria; presently the English as a whole are fighting against the Welsh and Scotch; then the English, Welsh, Scotch and some Irish, assembled under the standard of Great Britain, are fighting the Germans. With the advent of each new phase there is a growth in the size of the unit over which a particular form of political organization prevails; there is also a growth in the area over which the sentiment of patriotism operates.

It is difficult to suppose that the phase of the nation State, the phase in which we are now living, is either permanent or final, that the process which has led up to it will not pass beyond it, and that the final integration of nation States to constitute a federal union of States will not be achieved throughout the civilized world as it has already been achieved in certain parts of it—in Switzerland, for example, and in the United States.

THE FORCES THAT RESIST INTEGRATION

The periods during which new forms of integration have been in preparation have been periods of strife and unrest. To adopt a biological metaphor, everything looks as if the evolutionary process which expresses itself in the organisms known as human beings was travailing with the birthpangs of a new form. The period during which the nation States of contemporary Europe were being formed was precisely such a period—consider, for example, the periods of the Wars of the Roses in England and the Thirty Years War in Germany—and we are now living through another. The distresses which mark such periods would appear to be due to two main causes.

First, whatever form of organization happens at any given stage of the process to have been reached becomes the focus of a number of influential human sentiments. Whether it is family, or tribe, or principality, or State, it arouses in its adherents the most fanatical allegiance: men are jealous of its honour, they are pugnacious in its defence, they burn to sacrifice themselves in its service. Now all these sentiments combine to resist the absorption of the unit which excites them into a larger unit, and in the past it has been only at the cost of much suffering and bloodshed that such absorption has, in fact, been achieved. Why, nevertheless, is it achieved? Because of the drive of the evolutionary process which, having outgrown the stage of the nation State, is seeking to pass beyond it; or, if this way of putting the matter seems unnecessarily metaphysical, it is sufficient to point to the

fact that the changing circumstances of the time grow increasingly unfavourable to the existing political form and demand a larger and looser form of association, to reflect them. Here again we have a choice of interpretations: we may say that the process whereby changes in circumstances condition changes in political organization is to be interpreted on Marxist lines as part of a developing historical dialectic. Different circumstances, and in particular different economic circumstances, we shall say, dispose, if they do not determine, men to adopt different political forms. Or, adopting the terminology of creative evolution, we may again have recourse to the conception of an evolutionary force impelling men to adopt that form of political association which will enable them most effectively to fulfil the purposes for which it created them. In any event, we cannot avoid noticing that political forms *do* sooner or later adapt themselves to technological changes. The growth of the bourgeois class, due to mercantilism, was an important factor in the development of the nation State, just as the shrinkage of the world, due to the abolition of distance, is now driving men to pass beyond the nation State.

THE TIME LAG

But—and here we come to our second cause—as Marx pointed out, there is a time lag before men's political conceptions catch up with the changes in environmental circumstances which have preceded and which ultimately produce them. There is a period before adaptation takes place, another while it is taking place; sometimes it does not take place at all, and then civilization breaks down through its failure to adapt its forms to its needs. But the period before the change occurs, still more, the period during which it is occurring, are periods of great political instability. The obsolescent political form desperately endeavours to maintain its integrity against the increasing pressure of the forces which are brought to bear upon it, and, as the stresses engendered by its growing lack of adaptation increase, the air grows thick with rumours of war and

revolution. Something of this kind is happening in our own time, when men cling to the State in spite of the manifest tendency of the economic and technological organization of the world to drive them beyond it. Meanwhile, as we have seen, States adopt various devices to bolster up their individualities and erect artificial barriers to separate them from their neighbours, upon whom, as the world shrinks, they are ever more closely pressed. This is the situation which drives the State to make war. There are many causes of the present war—some economic, some religious, some psychological—but one, and that not the least potent, is to be found in the mutual exasperation caused by the pressure and resistance to pressure of States who are desperately trying to keep themselves to themselves yet wholly unable to keep themselves to themselves. It is *because* the State is an anachronism that it must try so desperately to maintain its individual sovereignty, *because* it is an anachronism that it becomes embroiled with other States.

The issues raised by this conception are too numerous to be pursued here, but I hope that enough has been said to show why a form of political organisation which has outlived its usefulness will be continuously disturbed by the forces which are seeking to supersede it, why, therefore, nation States in the modern world are perpetually at loggerheads, and why members of these States are perpetually threatened by war or the fear of war. If we ask what is responsible for the present situation, the answer in the long run is not this State or that but the persistence of the State as such in a world which has outgrown it.

THE STATE NO LONGER THE GUARDIAN OF RIGHTS

A State which is continuously hovering on the verge of war can no longer give its members security or afford to give them liberty. It can no longer, therefore, be an effective guarantor of their rights, and it can no longer preserve or continue the liberal tradition. The conclusion demanded by the tradition is that it should be superseded

by or subordinated to a different form of political organisation, that can perform the function which the State was intended to perform, but which it performs no longer. It will be instructive to implement this conclusion by a reference to the principles which the liberal tradition embodies, and the rights upon which it lays stress.

THE STATE AND LIBERTY

Let us begin with the right to liberty. That liberty has entirely disappeared in the totalitarian States is common knowledge. The quotations given in Chapter VI show that liberty has not only disappeared but that it is derided. How has it fared in our own democracy? For years before the war I, in common with every other citizen in this country whose income rose above a certain level, was taxed in order to support a vast armament. In no single year during the last ten years has my country spent less than £100,000,000 in perfecting its preparations for mass slaughter, while a year or so before the war was declared the sum increased to £1,500,000,000 to be expended over a period of five years. What proportion of the money that I have been required to pay in income tax to the State was devoted to the upkeep of armaments I do not know: it was large, and as time went on it grew larger. I was a pacifist who did not believe in the policy of defending oneself against armaments by amassing armaments yet greater, and thought that the way to deal with Germany was to try to meet her alleged grievances. Whether these opinions were right or wrong is not here to the point: the point is that I held them. Was I free not to pay for the armaments of which I disapproved? I was not. The money raised in taxation for the support and increase of armaments should, in my opinion, have been spent on education, on housing, on free medical services, on the provision of work for the unemployed. Was I free, was any single one of us free to direct the activities of the State to these constructive ends instead of to the ends of war? I was not. Again, I can think of many ways satisfactory to myself in

larger proportion of his earnings in the form of taxation, in order to prepare for war. Thus, while the enemy State deprives him of a large and increasing share of his possessions, in war, his own State deprives the individual of a large and increasing proportion of his earnings in peace.

THE STATE AND HEALTH

Or take health. The individual, says the Liberal tradition, has a right to health, and in peacetime the State, with its medical services, respects that right and makes reasonable provision for guaranteeing it. But in wartime this is far from being the case. War generates and spreads disease. In the influenza epidemic that followed the last war it is estimated that nearly twice as many people lost their lives in Europe (roughly 20,000,000) as during the war itself. The injury to health caused by the war was not less marked among the victors than among the vanquished: in fact the victors suffered rather more. In the present war it is expected that the coming winter will bring first famine and then epidemic to Europe. I say it is expected; I should add that, it is hoped, since the conditions of famine and disease created by our blockade are, next to ideas, to be reckoned among our most potent war-winning weapons; and this, we are all agreed, is a war that we must win.

THE STATE AND HAPPINESS

Finally, there is happiness. The individual, says the liberal tradition, has the right to happiness, and it is the State's business to guarantee it. Does it guarantee it? Assuredly it does not. The best recipe for happiness that I know consists in the exercise of one's faculties, tuned up to concert pitch, upon suitable material, interspersed with intervals of rest and recreation in the company of one's friends. It involves a life of effort and endeavour, devoted to the pursuit of ends that are thought to be valuable in themselves—the seeking after truth, the creating of beauty, the making of a career or a name or the founding of a family. In other words, the happy life is the life which is

integrated by one or more dominating purposes. Now the living of an integrated life, involving as it does the more or less continuous pursuit of a directive end, entails a stable and peaceful environment. How can a man be happy when the valleys are full of the sound of marching feet? How can he command the serenity to conceive or the skill to create beautiful things when his consciousness is filled with the distresses of a civilization that crumbles to pieces around him? With what comfort of mind and consistency of purpose can he conduct research when the State is liable to take the results of his labours and utilise them for the slaughter of his fellow men? In what spirit can he devote himself to the pursuit of truth, when he knows that the books in which his conclusions are embodied are liable to be burned and scattered to the winds with the ashes of the civilizations that gave them birth? With what heart can he beget children and found a family when he must face the prospect of those whom he loves being asphyxiated by gas, or blinded, or burnt, or maimed, or shattered? How, indeed, plan for a future as uncertain as ours has become?

THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED POWER

The State exists to promote or at least, to preserve the happiness of its members; yet it cannot do this if it plunges them into war. It may be said that a State at war has always been hostile to the happiness of its members. I doubt if this is so. Anybody who has read Jane Austen's novels knows how little the State of Great Britain interfered during the Napoleonic Wars with the happiness of its middle and upper classes. But what was true in Jane Austen's time is no longer true today. The modern State can no longer go to war without destroying or endangering the lives of every one of its members; for the same forces which have led to the shrinkage of the world, which have brought States into closer contact, jostled them together, sharpened their rivalries and embroiled them in war, have made war itself infinitely more terrible.

If you give a schoolboy an airgun he will shoot a few

sparrows or break a window or two, but that is the extent of the nuisance; provide him with a modern Tommy gun and you turn him into a public menace. One does not give children dangerous toys until one is satisfied that they can play with them without harm to themselves. One does not give the baby a box of matches. . . . Yet this precisely is what science has done to modern man, with the result that he is within measurable distance of destroying himself through sheer inability to control the powers which have been placed at his disposal. War, in fact, has become a luxury that man cannot afford if his civilization is to survive. Hence it is not necessary to show that human beings are worse than they were in the past, to realize the danger in which we stand: it is sufficient to point to the obligation which is imposed upon us to be very much better, precisely because we are so very much more dangerous. Similarly, it is not necessary to show that the form of political organization which we have hitherto embraced, the State, is more liable to lead to war than it was in the past, though this, as I have argued, is indeed the case. It is sufficient to point out that men can no longer afford what the State indulge in the allowance of war to which it has been accustomed in the past.

THE STATE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

To the traditional goods of the liberal tradition there has been added in our time the good of social and economic justice. It has been increasingly agreed among us that a man must not be debarred by his birth from such an education as will enable him to develop to the full the talents and capacities of his nature. Social justice means, in fact, the abolition of privilege. And economic justice? The phrase is a loose one, loosely employed. I take it to mean that a man should be guaranteed suitable employment at good wages, that he should have a reasonable amount of leisure, and that he should be able to combine with others to improve his conditions. Suitable employment and good wages! Can they be provided under capitalism? Can the individual's right to economic justice be guaranteed under

a system which recognizes profit-making as the only motive to enterprise and effort? Can we permit our economic life to be dominated any longer by the booms and slumps engendered by the unchecked operations of this motive? Must we not plan our economic life, and is effective planning possible under capitalism? My own answer to this last question is that it is not. I see that the "natural order" of things is that what men want should determine what men produce; that consumption, in other words, should control production and that production should control finance. I see that capitalism reverses this "natural order", and I see that even by its own standards capitalism has of recent years worked increasingly badly; that it gives less employment and not more, that it cannot distribute the goods which it produces, that it engenders alternative booms and slumps, and that the rivalries which it creates have played a major part in driving the world to war. And seeing all this, I am convinced that nothing but a planned economy of the kind that Socialists advocate will guarantee to man that social and economic justice which the liberal tradition demands.

IS SOCIALISM POSSIBLE IN SINGLE STATES?

If I do not deal with these matters at greater length, it is not because I do not deem them important, but because I have not the competence to deal with them: I am not an economist, and I am not sufficiently a fool to rush in where economists fail to keep step. I should not indeed have ventured to raise these matters, were it not for an important point of relevance which links them to my main theme. I have argued that to preserve the liberal tradition we must pass beyond the State, and I have added that social and economic justice is part of the liberal tradition. I have suggested that social justice requires planning, and that it must be planning of the kind which Socialists advocate. But I have now to ask, does not the achievement of a planned economy, and more particularly of a Socialist economy, also demand that we should pass beyond the State? Planning involves a measure of collective control over the economic

system of the country; it involves, in fact, a measure of Socialism. Now there seems to me to be abundant evidence that, so long as national States exist with their sovereignties unimpaired, Socialism has a strong tendency to turn into national Socialism, in the sense that it becomes as markedly nationalist as it is Socialist. It has done so in Russia, where it is more Socialist than nationalist; it has done so in Germany, where it is more nationalist than Socialist. It seems to me that there is a good reason for this development; it is that a State in which a Socialist system has been successfully achieved, conceives itself to be an object of suspicion to its neighbours. It feels that at any moment it may be attacked. Consequently, it amasses a vast armament to defend its so hardly achieved, its so jealously guarded system against counter-revolution from without, and there develops the familiar situation in which the armaments which the countries who own them profess to be defensive are denounced by all their neighbours as offensive; in fact, the historic pre-war situation. This is also the situation in which the alleged danger to the State is used as a pretext for dictatorship and suppression. For these reasons, I doubt if the achievement of Socialism without federation would prevent war; on the contrary, it would tend to produce ideological strife between those States which remained capitalist and those which had become Socialist. I have argued that the liberal tradition cannot survive war. If I am right, that part of the liberal tradition which is concerned with social justice cannot be achieved in war or under the threat of war; I doubt, therefore, whether the achievement of Socialism by any one country is sufficient to safeguard the liberal tradition unless that country forms part of a wider Federation.

CAPITALISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

Yet it is increasingly clear that social justice cannot be achieved under the pre-war régime of independent capitalist States. In the years before the war capitalism was visibly breaking down; its accumulating masses of unemployed, its inability to find consumers for the goods that

applied science enabled it increasingly to produce, its booms and slumps, these and other diseases of the capitalist system became more frequent in their visitation, and more severe in their incidence. Faced with this situation, capitalist States enclosed themselves within the walls of economic nationalism and sought by a hundred and one devices to impede the free flow of trade across the world. These devices only exacerbated the diseases which they sought to cure. Hence pre-war capitalism entered upon its vicious circle; capitalism in its decline tended to produce the conditions that made for war; because of these conditions States took protective measures which led still further to the decline of capitalism. Now declining capitalism cannot increase social justice: it is more likely, as in Germany and Italy, to deprive the workers of such privileges as they have won. Insofar as social justice is a part, albeit a lately included part, of the liberal tradition, I conclude that a world of competing, sovereign, capitalist States cannot ensure it. For the reasons already given, I doubt whether Socialist, sovereign States can ensure it any better than capitalist ones, unless the whole civilised world goes Socialist. The deduction appears to be that the supersession of the powers of the sovereign State is a necessary condition of the continuance of those instalments of social and economic justice which have marked the last century and a half of liberal legislation.

THE STATE AS THE ENEMY OF THE INDIVIDUAL

I have taken one by one the goods aimed at by the liberal tradition and tried to show how they are all threatened by the power of the modern State. In respect of its bearing upon liberty, security, possessions, health, happiness and social and economic justice the State, so far from guaranteeing the rights of individuals, destroys them, and, destroying them, negates the purpose for which it was formed. So far from being the protector, it has become the enemy of its citizens. Wherein is to be found the greatest enemy to the happiness of contemporary man? In poverty? Possibly.

In pain? Perhaps. In the wickedness of the human heart; No doubt. But these are secular evils; they have oppressed men in all times; they are in no sense distinctive of our own. Laying stress upon the word "contemporary", I should look in a different direction and answer that it is in the nation State. It is the unchecked power of the nation State which for a generation and a half has darkened the horizon of men's lives and to-day drives them to their destruction. The nation State regards itself as sole arbiter of right and wrong, claims to be judge and jury in its own cause, acknowledges no law to govern its relations with other States and no morality in restraint of its designs upon its neighbours. Over the lives and liberties of its citizens it exercises an absolute control. While proclaiming its determination to be free, it deprives its citizens of their freedom; for when the State goes to war to preserve its independence what man may call his soul his own?

It is the enemy of culture no less than of happiness. In every State to-day men of talent are imprisoned or interned. They are prevented from practising their arts, and the world is deprived of the enjoyment of their gifts. At the orders of the German State German musicians kill English painters; at the orders of the British State musicians, painters, poets and scholars languish in internment camps because they happen to have been born within the frontiers of a different State. Everywhere the creative spirit of man is hampered by the regulations of authority, its free expression stifled by the interference of officials. The man of genius is a gift to men from the gods, a privilege and a possession for us all. Yet if the genius happens to be a foreigner, the State forbids us to enjoy the gifts which he brings, unless he happens to have been born a long while ago. The nation State has become the Moloch of the modern world: upon its altars are sacrificed beauty, truth, happiness, virtue and life itself.

I suggest that the State has come in this way to oppress the lives and militate against the happiness of its citizens because in the conditions of the modern world the State means war; and the State means war because the State

has outlived its function, has become, in fact, an anachronism. Because it leads to war and because of the peculiar conditions which modern wars create the State can no longer continue to be the bearer of the liberal tradition. Either it becomes totalitarian and openly abandons that tradition or in its efforts to resist totalitarianism it must, while still retaining as ideals the values of that tradition, negate them in the process of defending them. So far as our own State is concerned, I make no complaint that this is so: I see that it must be so, if the Nazis are to be defeated. I see, too, that unless the Nazis are defeated all the political goods that I value will disappear utterly and for a period whose end no one can foresee. I am prepared, then, to surrender some part of the full enjoyment of the values of liberalism as the price which must be paid for that defeat; but I cannot blind myself to the danger which lies inherent in the situation, which is that unless war and the fear of war can be eradicated from the world, the conditions in which that tradition can continue to live will disappear. I am convinced that so long as we allow sovereign States the right to control foreign policies and levy armaments, so long as we permit them, as a result of that control, to destroy the world's peace whenever they believe that they can secure advantages by going to war, for just so long will wars continue. I conclude that the existing power of the State to make war must be surrendered to a federal government together with the control of its armed forces; I conclude also that a federal government must be the foundation of a new world order after the war; that the establishment of such a government should be among the principles for which we are waging the war and that we should make no bones about saying so, offering the peoples of Europe unity through federation as an alternative to unity under Hitler's domination.

FEDERATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIBERAL TRADITION

Reading through the above, I am conscious of its inadequacy. It is so feeble an introduction to the unfolding

of a great idea. In the hope of excusing the poverty of my performance I venture to remind the reader that this is not a statement, much less an advocacy, of the case for federal union in its completeness. My purpose has been more limited: I have been concerned solely to present one aspect of that case, the bearing of federation on what I have called the liberal tradition. I have sought to show that the enlargement of the bounds of the political unit and the subordination of the national State to a federal authority have become indispensable conditions of the continuance of that tradition. It is for this reason that it seems necessary to associate with the principles of that tradition the further principle which is, in my view, the prerequisite of their realization. It is because of the relevance of federation to the conditions of our time, because, as I see it, the supersession of the absolute sovereignty of the nation State is necessary not merely to the progress but to the survival of Western civilization, that federation has the importance which I have claimed for it as a war-winning weapon. Proposals for federation are in the air, and Mr. Churchill's gallant offer to France is the harbinger of greater things to come. This generation is in travail with something that is greater than the nation State, and the sufferings of the war may be but the birth pangs that attend its delivery. If out of the ashes of this war there arises the phoenix of a European federation, then Hitler will not have lived and hated in vain. Meanwhile, the vision of a united Europe beyond Hitler will help us in the fight against Hitler; for there is one thing in the world that is stronger than force, and that is an idea whose time has come. For this reason I would urge that to the historic principles of the liberal tradition we add that of federation, that we formulate these principles and announce them as our war aims. Finally, I would plead with those who are in agreement with the argument of this book to press the Government to publish such a statement, and to publish it quickly.

